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ABSTRACT 
The Aceh conflict has been one of the longest running in Asia. When the 
memorandum of understanding between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM 
(Free Aceh Movement) was finally signed on August 15, 2005, in Helsinki, Finland. The 
agreement brought an end to the nearly thirty years of bloody armed conflict that claimed 
15.000 lives, displaced tens of thousands and impacted the whole country economically, 
as well as politically. In the early process, many expressed their skepticism with the 
government in handling this conflict, due to the failure of previous two peace settlements. 
Many believed that GAM had to be eliminated by employing military operations. The 
military options, however, proved ineffective to eliminate rebellion.  Instead, the military 
abuses and resource exploitation have only increased the GAM’s public support.  The 
Helsinki peace agreement appears to have a better chance to put an end to the separatist 
conflict in Aceh. This win-win solution settlement has so far worked well. However, 
lessons learned from this conflict will be beneficial for any government, and the military, 
in handling conflicts that might take us into the future. Indeed, instead of military 
options, Helsinki’s peace agreement has always been the best solution for the future of 
Aceh. 
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A. THESIS BACKGROUND 
Many historians believe that Islam first came to Indonesia through Aceh, in 
northern Sumatra, around 700 AD.1  In the early sixteenth century, Aceh played an 
important role in developing the prominent religion of Islam, and was the most powerful 
North Sumatran state. The first Aceh sultan was Ali Mughayat Syah, whose tombstone is 
dated 1530.2  One of Aceh’s greatest sultans was Sultan Alaudin Riayat Syah al-Kahar. 
Under his administration, Aceh progressed both commercially and ideologically.  In 
economics, Aceh was the Southeast Asian trading hub, and the Acehnese depicted their 
land as the “Serambi Mekkah” (the verandah of Mecca) of Southeast Asia.3  The 
importance of local commodities such as pepper, nutmeg and clove in world trade created 
fierce local competition for the Portuguese who controlled the Malacca Strait.   
The history of the Aceh conflict began in the sixteenth century when the sultanate 
of Aceh contested the Portuguese domination over the international pepper trade.  Three 
centuries later, the Acehnese fought with the Dutch, who were the primary colonists.  The 
conflict continued then with the Acehnese against the Indonesian central government, and 
lasted almost three decades.  After WWII, the first rebellion in Aceh took place in 1953 
when Daud Beureuh and his followers declared the Aceh region a part of Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII, Indonesia Islamic State of Indonesia) in August 1949.  Daud Beureuh’s 
armed wing began attacks on government offices and security posts and seized weapons.4  
The clashes ended in 1962 and the Indonesian government granted a special status for the 
                                                 
1 Florence Lamoureux, Indonesia: a global studies handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 69. 
2 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 6. 
3 Anthony Reid, “Pre-modern Sultanate’s View of its Place in the World,” in Veranda of Violence, ed. 
by Anthony Reid, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 56. 
4 M. Isa Sulaiman, “From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist 





Aceh Province.  However, after natural gas resources were discovered in 1971, the 
rebellion resurfaced under the name the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).  This time the 
conflict was triggered by both political and economic factors and lasted much longer. 
Between 1970 and the early 2000s, the Indonesian government tried to put an end 
to the rebellion by utilizing various policies.  However, its efforts to put GAM down 
relied heavily on military options, and these generated human right abuses. Initially, 
military operations suppressed the rebellion, but over time, GAM gained support from 
both inside and outside the country, including weapons and training. Hundreds of GAM 
members enjoyed military training in Libya.5  When the Indonesian government declared 
Aceh a military operation zone (Indonesian acronym DOM) in the late 1980s, the 
Indonesian military fought GAM with COIN (counter-insurgency) strategies.  Although 
military actions managed to reduce GAM’s strength significantly, the negative impact of 
the military approach also had political consequences.  The Indonesian military was 
frequently linked to allegations of a series of human right violations such as murder, 
torture, and abduction that made the situation even worse.6 
The post-Soeharto government, under President Habibie (1998–1999) used a 
different approach.  He admitted the mistakes of the past and promised to give greater 
autonomy to Aceh.  President Wahid (1999–2001) initiated peace talks with GAM that 
were mediated by the Henry Dunant Center (HDC).  His successor, President Megawati, 
granted a special autonomy status to the Aceh province in 2001 and continued 
negotiations with GAM.  However, when the peace talks failed in 2003, the Indonesian 
government responded by imposing, again, a military strategy known as an “integrated 




                                                 
5 Sulaiman, “From Autonomy to Periphery,” 138. 
6 ICG Report No. 18, Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis 




to destroy GAM; although the military was able to reduce GAM’s fighting capacity.  
However, the government failed to force GAM to accept autonomy and the armed 
rebellion continued.7 
On August 15, 2005, in Helsinki, Finland, representatives from GAM and the 
government of Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating that the 
conflict had been concluded.  Since then, GAM has transformed itself from an armed 
insurgency group into a political movement, and its struggle began to pay off when 
Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM leader, became Governor of Aceh after he won the local 
elections.  On February 8, 2007, Irwandi and Muhammad Nazar officially took the oaths 
as governor and vice-governor of Aceh province and pledged their allegiance to the 
Republic of Indonesia.  However, after four years of peace, the government of Indonesia 
(GoI) and especially the military, still face factors that could disrupt the peace process 
due to the nature of the conflict being  deep rooted and multi-faceted.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the government of Indonesia 
resolved its internal conflicts by using military and political approaches.  This thesis will 
focus on the role of the GoI and the security forces, especially the Indonesian military, in 
handling a longstanding secessionist movement in Aceh Province.  In doing so, I will 
explore the historical background of the Aceh conflict to discover the root causes of the 
conflict, and analyze the shortcomings of military and political strategies in combating 
Aceh separatists.  The paper will thus draw some lessons from this conflict, and it will be 
useful for the Indonesian Military (TNI) for counter-insurgency efforts with a view to 
generating appropriate responses from other separatist movements within Indonesia.  
                                                 
7 Kirsten E. Schulze, “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 





C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Conceptual Literature 
a. McCormick’s Model 
A good model for understanding counter-insurgency (COIN) is the 
Diamond model, or “Mystic diamond,” developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick, the head 
of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.  From this simple 
model, I will discuss the ineffectiveness of the military operations that were launched by 
the Indonesian authority.  The McCormick Diamond model provides explanations on 
how governments should resolve their internal armed conflicts. I will offer a broad 
understanding on how a counter-insurgency strategy should be carried out by using this 
model.  There are interactions between the government, the insurgents, the population, 
and international actors. I will demonstrate a situation where the Indonesian government 
competes with GAM to win the hearts and minds of the Aceh population. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Diamond Model8 
                                                 
8 See Eric P. Wendt, “Strategy Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare, (2005), 6.   
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In Figure 1, we can see that the upper part of the model depicts the internal 
environment.  People are placed on top of the diamond model; this means that the 
government and GAM target the same center of gravity—the popular support of the 
Acehnese.  The battle is to contest the legitimacy of control over the population (as 
shown on leg 1 and leg 2).  Therefore, the government has to cut GAM off from its 
popular support and win by isolating, capturing, and killing the GAM leaders.  At the 
same time, the government has to provide security and the fulfillment of the people’s 
needs to reduce GAM’s influence over the population.  By destroying the GAM 
infrastructure, the government can use its own force advantages, the military and police.  
On the other hand, GAM, as argued by McCormick’s theory, also has information 
advantages; they can blend into the population and locate the government forces. In some 
cases, GAM attacked the security forces in Aceh, but it was not easy for the government 
forces to reach the GAM positions.  
When the Indonesian government employed its COIN strategy, it was 
clear that the military paid less attention to legs 1 and 2, and tended to attack GAM 
directly, measuring success by the number of enemy killed as well as by how many of 
GAM’s weapons were confiscated (as shown on leg 3).  The lower part of McCormick’s 
Diamond model describes the external environment.  In the case of the Aceh conflict 
where GAM obtained additional weapons and training from the outside, the government 
had to hamper the flow of financing and supply for the insurgents, and without the 
support from the outside, GAM could not win the battle (leg 5).  Similarly, the 
government needed support from the neighboring countries in order to gain some 
legitimacy from external actors (leg 4).  In Chapter III, McCormick’s model will be used 
to analyze the GoI/TNI missteps in Aceh. 
b. Constructive Conflict Resolution 
A study dealing with conflict resolution written by Louis Kriesberg will be 
a second framework used in this thesis.  It will help to provide broad understanding in 




will discuss in Chapter IV the Kriesberg conflict and components that affect the degree of 
destructiveness, such as identity, grievance, goals, and methods and conclude that the 
Aceh conflict tended to be more constructive over time. 
Also in Chapter IV, I will focus on the process fostering de-escalation 
between GAM and the government of Indonesia. In this conflict, both GAM and GoI 
realized that they needed to put an end to the conflict (de-escalation).  The Indonesian 
military could not defeat GAM militarily because human rights abuses by the security 
forces (negative impact of using military forces) further alienated the ordinary Acehnese.  
Since GAM could not defeat the Indonesian forces either, and given that there was no 
international support for Acehnese independence, the autonomy plan is the only 
alternative at the time that would put an end to the prolonged conflict. 
According to Kriesberg, each party tries to change the conflict for the 
mutual beneficial outcome or to achieve a “win-win” solution.  He discusses two 
processes in creating conflict de-escalation.  First is what he calls the “social 
psychological process” that is illustrated by generating sympathy and empathy from the 
internal communities.  These events subsequently prompted both parties to de-escalate 
the conflict.  After violence escalated in 1999–2000, it was halted temporarily by 
negotiations between GAM and the government, brokered by the Henri Dunant Centre, a 
Geneva-based organization.  The peace negotiation broke down shortly after the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was signed in December 2002.  The 
government responded by declaring a military emergency, which was downgraded to a 
civilian emergency in May 2004.  When the Tsunami hit in December 2004, it caused 
hundreds of thousands of death in Aceh, destroyed most of GAM’s infrastructures, and 
led to the flowing of outside aid organization for Aceh.  This caused GAM to propose a 
unilateral ceasefire.  
Second is the process of involvement where other parties can also 
contribute to de-escalation. International organizations such as the Henri Dunant Centre, 
and the Crisis Management Initiative, along with prominent international leaders have 




Martti Ahtisaari led an NGO and the Crisis Management Initiative and mediated the 
Helsinki peace talks on Aceh.  The peace agreement between GAM and the government 
was finally signed in August 2005.  Indeed, in order to manage conflict effectively, the 
government and GAM must develop policies that are responsive to the phase and nature 
of the conflict, the conflict situation, and the change of external conditions.  Minimizing 
violence and using nonviolent strategy is generally an effective course of action for 
making conflicts constructive.  GAM and the Indonesian Government realize that they 
cannot go on as they have, and that compromise and cooperation guarantee a better 
future. 
2. Empirical Literature 
My thesis will mostly be based upon a qualitative method of evaluating the 
performance of the GoI in general, and the Indonesian military, in particular, in 
combating GAM, but I shall be using some of the facts and figures provided by reports 
either from the Indonesian Military or other institutions.  I will also use newspaper 
articles, journal articles and various books.  It is important to include the personal insights 
of high ranking military officers and local government figures (such as Aceh’s regional 
military commander and the governor of Aceh) as well as some international NGO 
figures, scholars and ordinary Acehnese people.  Therefore, between April 17 and March 
7, 2009, I travelled to Indonesia to attend an international conference in Banda Aceh, and 
interviewed the key figures of the Aceh conflict in Aceh and Jakarta in order to get a 
wider and deeper understanding about the Aceh problems in the past, the present, and in 
the future.  The direct research study in Aceh will also be beneficial for measuring the 
success of the peace agreement that was signed on August 15, 2005.  
D. CHAPTER–BY–CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II (Historical Background) begins with a brief discussion of when Aceh 
was under the reign of the sultanates when it was widely known as a center of 
commercial, culture and Islam on the Malay Peninsula in the early seventeenth century.  




there is a paradox to our understanding of the following rebellions. Aceh initially 
supported the newly established republic, but became strongly opposed the central 
government. 
Chapter III (Military Approaches) provides an analysis on whether or not the 
Counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy worked in settling the Aceh conflict. I will use 
McCormick’s Diamond Model as a tool to assess the success and failure, as well as 
consequences in the COIN operations, which depended heavily upon military options and 
lacked non-military approaches. 
In Chapter IV (Political Approaches), the analysis will use Kriesberg’s study on 
conflict resolution to examine how the conflict in Aceh escalated, and how the GoI 
handled the situation to de-escalate the conflict through a series of negotiations following 
its unsuccessful military operations and peace talks.  GAM and the GoI finally managed 
to conclude a peace agreement in 2005. 
As a final point, in Chapter V (Conclusion and Recommendation) the findings are 
summarized.  Although peaceful settlement has worked well so far, factors that could 
hamper the peace processes remain due to the nature of the conflict in Aceh.  The distrust 
between GAM and the military can potentially spark greater clashes in the future.  To 
prevent this from happening, I will provide recommendations for both parties to maintain 










II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ACEH CONFLICT 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Aceh9 
 
                                                 
9 Map is taken from ICG, Asia Briefing No. 61 Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh (Jakarta/Brussels: 





Before the armed rebels began attacking the soldiers of the government of 
Indonesia in 1989, rebellion and violence had routinely taken place in Aceh’s history. 
Aceh experienced its ‘golden age’ when Sultan Iskandar Muda came to power (1607–
1636).  During his reign, the Aceh sultanate achieved its largest territorial reach; it was 
the most powerful state in the region and became known as an international center of 
Islamic commerce and education. In the colonial era, Aceh was famous for its long war 
against the Dutch at the end of nineteenth century.  After the independence of Indonesia 
in 1945, the Acehnese also struggled for their identity and interests against the newly 
established government of Indonesia.  The first Acehnese rebellion against the GoI was 
inspired by the Darul Islam movement in 1953.  The Acehnese did not seek independence 
or a greater profit sharing of natural resources revenue as they later demanded, but 
mainly called for a greater autonomy and more of an Islamic role in the government.  At 
that time, the rebellion was not under the banner of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free 
Aceh Movement).  It was not until 1971 that GAM emerged after massive oil and gas 
reserves were discovered in Aceh province.  Some scholars believe that these natural 
resources contributed to the duration of the Aceh conflict.10  To understand the Aceh 
rebellion, this chapter seeks to explain the principal cause of the rebellion in two parts, 
namely early history, in which the Acehnese clashed with Portuguese, and middle history 
as defined by the struggle against the Dutch.  Therefore, in the first part of this chapter, I 
will explore the history of Aceh in the period of the sultanates in the early sixteenth 
century when the Acehnese fought with the Portuguese over the great trading city of 
Malacca on the Malay Peninsula in 1511.   
 
 
                                                 
10 Michael L. Ross, “What do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace 
Research, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2004), 343. In his article, Ross gives a 
list of nations where natural resources have indirect connections to the duration of the conflict. Secessionist 




B. PRE-COLONIAL TO INDEPENDENCE (1524–1945) 
1. The Emergence of the Acehnese (1524) 
In the early fifteenth century, Europe was not the most highly developed area of 
the world, nor was it the most vibrant. As Ricklefs argues, the greatest player in the world 
was Islam, which was reaching Indonesia and the Philippines after the Ottoman Turks 
occupied Constantinople, the imperial capital of the Roman Empire in 1453.11  Islam was 
the predominant religion in Aceh since the thirteenth century, brought by Muslim 
merchants from the Middle East and India before the appearance of Europeans in this 
region. In the fourteenth century, Lhokseumawe in North Aceh was a port of the Pasai 
Kingdom and an important center of trade and Islamic education.12  The Portuguese, on 
the other hand, made technological advances through the development of geography and 
astronomy making them the greatest navigators of all time.  They built durable, larger and 
faster ships that were strong enough to carry heavy guns and that allowed them to 
challenge Muslim domination.13  The Portuguese also had economical motives, such as 
searching for spices, one of the most highly sought commodities anywhere in the world. 
For that reason, the Portuguese began attempting to find the “Spice Islands.”14  The 
northern coast of Aceh was recognized as the largest producer of pepper when Alfonso de 
Albuquerque (1459–1415), a general officer and Portuguese nobleman, conquered the 
Malacca Strait in 1511. 
The Acehnese Sultan, Ali Mughayat Shah (1514–1530) challenged the Portuguese 
domination and declared Aceh an independent state that controlled the trading hub in the 
peninsula.15  With the support from the local population, Mughayat Shah defeated a 
                                                 
11 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 22. 
12 Anthony Reid, The Contest of North Sumatra; Atjeh, the Netherlands, and Britain, 1858–1898 
(Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Oxford University Press, University of Malaya Press,1969), 1. 
13 Jeremy Black, Cambridge Illustrated Atlas, Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution, 1492–1792 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15. 
14 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 23. 
15 Tim Kell, The Root of Acehnese Rebellion 1989–1992 (New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia 




Portuguese fleet at sea, and at the same time, conquered Pidie and Pasai in 1524 after 
conquering Deli.16  This period marked the integration of the conquered areas into the 
Aceh Besar (Greater Aceh) region and the people became acculturated as Acehnese.17  
The Aceh Kingdom also expanded its territory during the administration of Sultan 
Ala’ad-din Riayat Shah al-Kahar (1537–1571), and Aceh remained the powerful military 
force in the Malacca Strait.18  Kahar was the second of Aceh’s greatest sultans, and its 
territory expanded to Aru (known today as Deli, North Sumatra)19 and Pariaman before 
subsequently declining in power on the west coast up to Barus (present day North 
Sumatra).20  Aceh reached its “golden age” during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda 
(1607–1636) and made Aceh the most influential state that controlled the Malacca 
Strait.21  His achievements were largely based on remarkable military power. Iskandar’s 
power reached as far as Deli, Inderapura, and claimed most of the important ports as far 
south as Asahan [North Sumatra]. He also conquered Pahang, Johor, Kedah, and Perak 
on the Malay Peninsula as well as Nias in the 1620s.22  Aceh in this period was identified 
not only as a major center of Islamic learning and trade, but it was also recognized as an 
Islamic state.23  And yet it did not last long as the power of Sultan Iskandar Muda 
suffered a decline after the Portuguese destroyed hundreds of his ships and some 19,000 




                                                 
16 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 33. 
17 Reid, 2. 
18 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 33. 
19 A. C. Milner, E. Edwards McKinnon, and Tengku Luckman Sinar, A Note on Aru Kota Cina 
(Southeast Asia Program Publication at Cornell University, 1978), 5.   
20 Kell, The Root, 4. 
21 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 34;Tim Kell, The Root of Acehnese Rebellion 1989–1992 
(New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995), 5. 
22 Kell, The Root, 4. 
23 Ibid. 




movements of uleebalang against the Iskandar’s oppressive measures, and the 
competition between the Dutch and the British colonial powers over Aceh’s abundant 
natural resources.25  
In 1641, the Dutch gained control of the Malay Peninsula and as a result, the 
influence of the Aceh sultanate was undermined in terms of its economic and political 
power.  The sultanate authority was subsequently limited to approximately those areas 
that the province covers today.  In 1666 and 1667, the Dutch managed to take over 
Malacca and put an end to the Aceh sultanate’s control of the region.  The downfall of the 
Sultan of Aceh led to the reduction of its territory, and from then on he only controlled 
Banda Aceh and its ports.  The demise of Iskandar led to a change in the political patterns 
of Aceh.  Iskandar then gave an opportunity to the uleebalang to control the trade in their 
respective territory and remain politically independent from the sultanate.  Reid suggests 
that uleebalang in this period had dual functions as both war leaders and territorial chiefs 
who were rewarded with grants of land in the area conquered by the sultans.26  At the end 
of seventeenth century the sultanate became a weak symbolic institution after Aceh 
entered long episode of internal disunion.27  
2. The Impact of the London Treaty (1824) 
Acehnese power began to decline in the seventeenth century, and the great 
European powers, the Dutch and the British, fought for control.28  The 1819 treaty was 
the negotiation between the sultanate and the British, and as a result, the British obtained 
exclusive commercial privileges with the Acehnese.29  The British promised to support 
the sultanate militarily, and the sultanate agreed to make no foreign alliances without 
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British approval30.  The next treaty, the London treaty of 1824, also known as the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty, created the states of Malaysia and Indonesia by partitioning the sphere of 
interest between the Dutch and British along the Straits of Singapore and Malacca.31 The 
1824 treaty was not only designed to resolve some issues regarding the Napoleonic war 
(1803–1805) in Europe, but also to guarantee that the British would continue to trade in 
the Malay Peninsula.32  An article of the 1824 treaty also stated that the two powers 
recognized the independence of Aceh.33  The agreement authorized the Dutch to gain full 
control of Sumatra.  Although the treaty marked the end of the British permanent 
presence in Aceh, the commercial relations with the sultanate of Aceh was continued, and 
in fact, the trading expanded to British areas of influence such as Penang, Thailand and 
Burma.34   
By the 1820s, Aceh contributed over half of the world’s pepper production.  The 
pepper production continued to grow when Aceh was under Sultan Muhammad Syah 
(1823–38) and the production increased 13 million pounds (5,800 tons) in 1839 due to 
the opening of new plantations in some regions of Aceh.35  In addition, the sultanate of 
Aceh under Sultan Ali Ala’ad-din Mansyur Syah (1838–70) remained powerful and 
enjoyed impressive economic development, which forced the Dutch to continue to 
respect Aceh as an independent state.  However, the fierce rivalries between uleebalang 
and the sultanate led the Acehnese sultan to grant trading rights, land, and a degree of 
autonomy to the uleebalang, especially for those who were loyal to the ruler, to increase 
pepper production.36  The booming pepper production drew pepper traders from Europe 
and America, but the benefit went to the local uleebalang, who controlled particular 
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ports, and the profit did not go to the sultan.  The pepper wealth generated powerful and 
independent-minded uleebalang, and as a result, the sultan’s power became less 
important in commercial and political affairs.37  Moreover, the establishment of 
Singapore, due to the 1824 treaty, led to an economic downturn for the Aceh sultanate, as 
the British was now served by Singapore, and this made Aceh less important for British 
strategic and commercial interests in the region.38  In the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, the world pepper price and production gradually declined due to soil exhaustion 
and the weakening Aceh economy in general.39  In the 1819 treaty, the British agreed to 
protect Aceh militarily, and in the 1824 treaty, they recognized the independence of 
Aceh, but then the policy changed.  The British no longer considered Ache’s 
independence to be feasible, and finally let the Dutch have Aceh.  The Dutch were 
subsequently involved in the Aceh War of 1873. 
3. The Dutch Colonialism (1873–1942) 
a. The Dutch-Aceh War (1873–1903) 
On March 26, 1873, Dutch fleets began an attack on Banda Aceh and this 
marked the beginning of Aceh’s war against the Dutch.  The Dutch forces were 
comprised of some 3,000 strong under the leadership of Maj. Gen. J.H.R. Kohler.  The 
Dutch suffered many casualties and even the commander himself, Kohler, was killed.40  
The first attacks failed to gain their strategic objective; instead, the Dutch suffered defeat 
at the hands of the Acehnese.41  The second attack, which took place in November 1873, 
was led by Lieutenant General J. Van Swieten, with a larger number of troops, some 
13,000, who stormed the sultanate and seized Sultan Mahmud Syah (1870–74) and ended 
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the succession of the last of Aceh’s sultanate dynasty.42The Acehnese, however, were 
ready to defend their land and the Dutch’s military operation to capture Aceh became the 
longest and bloodiest colonial campaign.  The Dutch suffered many casualties over time 
due to combat and non-combat causes, such as cholera and other diseases.  This bad 
situation forced the Dutch to conclude with a treaty to finalize their dominance, which 
was impossible, as the sultanate had been abolished when the Dutch claimed victory over 
Aceh in January 1874.43  Nevertheless, the Dutch lost some 7,000 of their troops by the 
end of 1878.  According some estimates, the Dutch-Aceh War lasted for more than 30 
years (until 1914) and claimed no less than 17,500 on the Dutch side, and around 70,000 
lives on Aceh’s side.44  When Sultan Mahmud died of cholera, Tuanku Muhammad Daud 
Syah was declared by the Acehnese to be Sultan Ibrahim Mansyur Syah (1875–1907).  
The Acehnese refused to give up.  After recognizing the tough Acehnese resistance, the 
Dutch ultimately announced that the war was over in 1881.  This made the Aceh 
resistance Southeast Asia’s first successful guerilla strategy against any European 
power.45  
Ironically, the relationship of the uleebalang with external forces during 
the Dutch-Aceh War grew more cooperative in order to safeguard its own commercial 
interests.  While the commercial activities in this region were growing, the seeds of 
disunity among the Acehnese became apparent since the uleebalang themselves were 
divided by political and economic rivalry.  For this reason the uleebalang could not 
provide the unity necessary for resistance to the Dutch.  This situation led to the 
emergence of the ulama (clerics) to lead the struggle against the Dutch and galvanize 
anti-colonial sentiment among the society.  Tengku Sheik Saman di Tiro, a charismatic 
religious leader of Pidie emerged in this period (1836–91).  He inspired the guerilla 
resistance by popularizing an Acehnese epic poem, Hikayat Perang Sabil (The Epic of 
the Holy War), an important religious-based struggle that turned the battle into a holy war 
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for the faith.46  In this period, Ulama gained an important position during the Dutch 
occupation, since the escalating uleebalang’s dependence on the Dutch, and subsequently 
increased alienation from the Aceh society.  
By the 1890s, Aceh was no longer an important commercial hub of the 
Malay Peninsula.  The situation deteriorated after the death of Tengku Sheikh Saman di 
Tiro in 1891 and led to the gradual conquest of Aceh by the Dutch.  The presence of Dr. 
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), the most prominent Dutch scholar of Islam, 
and Joannes Benecdictus van Heutsz (1851–1924) deteriorated the Aceh position.  Both 
advised the colonial government on Islamic matters to undertake a costly policy to crush 
the fanatical resistance of the ulama by relying upon the uleebalang who were seen as 
secular chiefs.47 This strategy made the resistance of the Acehnese recede drastically 
when the death toll of  the Acehnese reached 20,000 within ten years.48  The last Aceh 
sultan, Muhammad Daud Syah, surrendered in 1903, and showed that the Aceh conquest 
had been achieved by the Dutch.49  But it was not until 1910 that the Dutch were 
ultimately able to integrate Aceh into the Dutch East Indies.50  Up until 1913, the ulama-
led guerilla remained tough.  All Tengku di Tiro’s seven sons were killed, including 
Tengku Mahyuddin, the grandfather of Hasan Tiro, the leader of the latter Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM).51  The Dutch had crushed the resistance and installed an 
administration headed by the uleebalang.52 However, the Acehnese resistance was never 
completely put down until Indonesia declared independence in 1945.  Afterward, the only 
region the Dutch did not want to re-enter was Aceh.53  The absence of the Dutch led to 
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the assassination and imprisonment of the prominent uleebalang by pro-independence 
forces led by the religious leaders, generating a new social structure based upon Islamic 
values under the leadership of ulama.54  
b. The Japanese Occupation (1942–45) 
Weeks before the Japanese arrived in Aceh on February 19, 1942, and 
knowing that they were about to come, the ulama took the lead to organize a general 
revolt against the Dutch.  Enthusiastically greeting the Japanese, and in the hopes of 
driving the Dutch out of Aceh, many PUSA ulama (All Aceh Ulama Association) 
supported the Japanese invasion.55  In the final years of the Dutch occupation, the 
violence escalated between the uleebalang and the Acehnese-backed ulama.  When Aceh 
was under the Dutch administration, the Dutch successfully implemented the well-known 
tactic of devide et impera (divide and rule) to break the Acehnese ruling class into two 
groups, the ulama and the uleebalang.  Under the Japanese occupation however, the 
ulama enjoyed a strong position due to the creation of religious courts and they separated 
the ulama from the influence of the uleebalang.  This policy indirectly recognized 
Islamic law, and contributed to the strengthening of the authority of the ulama.56  
The Japanese invasion marked one of the most important events of 
Indonesian history, as before the invasion, no serious confrontations with the Dutch had 
emerged.  There were so many significant changes under the Japanese that led to the 
Indonesian revolution, that in fact, under the ulama leadership, Islamic-based education 
such as madrasah (Islamic school) developed significantly.  PUSA was established in 
this period (1939), and the first chairman of this organization was one of the most 
prominent religious figures, Daud Beureuh of Pidie.  All the revolutionary movements, 
therefore, gradually integrated themselves into PUSA, transforming it into a political 
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organization.57  The Japanese made the revolution possible by recruiting, indoctrinating, 
arming, and training the younger generation in Giyugun military units.58  These actions 
stimulated nationalism among the society, and as a consequence, the Dutch became the 
target of looting and personal violence and even deadly attacks.  After defeating the 
Dutch and taking over the administration, the Japanese continued to use uleebalang, as 
the Dutch previously had, to run the government, and as a consequence, increased hatred 
toward uleebalang.   
The sudden collapse of the Japanese in 1945 drew the youth movements to 
join the struggle for Indonesian independence.  In October 1945, the older ulama 
supported their struggle by signing the so-called “Declaration of Ulama throughout 
Aceh,” and four prominent ulama signed the declaration including Daud Beureuh.  He 
himself pronounced the struggle to be a “holy war.” Anthony Reid depicted Daud 
Beureuh as the first of the prominent religious leaders to speak up for the Republic.59  
The emergence of the nationalism seeds, however, did not come from the new republican 
leaders, but from a coalition of PUSA ulama, the madrasah-educated youths, and 
subsequently transformed them into social revolutionaries to challenge the uleebalang.  
They formed a militia and declared a social revolution that was popularly known as 
Perang Cumbok” (Cumbok War) to eradicate the uleebalang and confiscate their 
property.60  As a result, hundreds of uleebalang lost their lives in the battle for 
government control.  The uleebalang were finally eliminated in 1946, and the PUSA 
ulama and the forces associated with them took control of Aceh.  The vacant positions 
that had been held by the uleebalang in the past were filled by the PUSA leaders and 
made Daud Beureuh a military governor on August 26, 1947, under the direction of Vice-
President Muhammad Hatta.61 
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C. THE REBELLIONS  
1. Introduction  
Some scholars attempted to find out the causes of the emergence of the Acehnese 
nationalist movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or Free Aceh Movement), led by 
Hasan Tiro.  The government was unable to suppressed GAM permanently; GAM had 
the ability to make a comeback at a later date.  Many believed that the secessionist 
movement that began in October 1976 was the result of several causes such as the 
exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources, the brutal military actions, as well as the 
imposition of various unjust policies toward Aceh that led to the alienation of the 
Acehnese by the Republic.  Why did the Acehnese, who since the revolutionary era had 
stood firm behind the new Republic and shared ideals and values to mobilize the 
population against the Dutch now rebel against the Republican government?  The 
transformation of the Acehnese preference from a strong proponent of Indonesia to its 
most rebellious entity needs an explanation. 
Daud Beureuh declared the revolt in September 1953, and demanded that all 
Muslims work to establish a government based on Syariah law (Islamic law) following 
the bloody social revolution to overthrow the political power of uleebalang.  Some 
believed that the emergence of GAM was linked to the first revolt.  This was 
understandable since the initial leaders of the first GAM rebellion were former Darul 
Islam (DI) figures.  There was, however, one main difference between the Darul Islam 
movement and GAM in terms of their goals.  To address this issue and understand the 
differences between the two, I will discuss the emergence of the first rebellion that was 
inspired by the Darul Islam movement.  Darul Islam leaders justified violence primarily 
in terms of the obligation for all Muslims to create a government based on God’s law and 
demanded that the Indonesian state be based on Islamic law.62  Unlike the Darul Islam 
                                                 
62 Edward Aspinall, “Violence and Identity Formation in Aceh under Indonesia Rule,” in Verandah of 




rebellion, GAM was obviously pro-independence in nature, secular, and demanded 
separation from the Republic of Indonesia.63   
2. The Darul Islam Rebellion (1953–1962) 
The incorporation of Aceh into the Indonesian Republic demonstrated the 
significant loyalty of Acehnese leaders to the concept of the Indonesian state.  The 
combination of an exclusive sense of unity of Aceh’s glorious past as a regional power, 
their never-give-up attitude to the Dutch, and their strong Islamic identity, brought them 
into the new Republic.  Acehnese elites and the population struggled against the Dutch 
through social revolution, and shared their common values and ideals to support the 
Indonesian nationalist movement, which took place throughout almost the entire country.  
They also showed their strong position when the Dutch returned and fought against the 
new Republic in 1947–1948.  The Acehnese consolidated their resources and became one 
of the Republic’s strongholds.64  When the Dutch subsequently regained control of the 
main cities in Java, they did not return to Aceh.65  Under the PUSA administration, Aceh 
refused the Dutch offer to establish Aceh as a state in a Dutch-led federal system.  At that 
time, Aceh enjoyed a relatively healthy financial condition due to the export of various 
commodities such pepper, rubber, tea and coffee to the neighboring countries.66  When 
President Soekarno visited Aceh on June 17, 1948, Aceh provided two airplanes to the 
Republic, and named Seulawah RI 01 and Seulawah RI 02.  In addition, Aceh also 
contributed a sum of money for supporting Indonesian diplomats in their efforts to 
persuade the international public to recognize the existence of the newly-formed 
Republic.67  In exchange for that, the Acehnese wanted the new Republic to adopt 
Islamic values. 
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Before the Japanese surrender, on 22 June 1945, Indonesian Muslims asserted 
their political will by drafting a preamble to the constitution that was also known as the 
“Piagam Jakarta” (Jakarta Charter).  The controversial assertion was on the first principle 
of Pancasila, which states “the belief in one God, with the obligation for adherents of 
Islam to practice Syariah (Islamic law).” After the “Panitia Sembilan” (Nine Member of 
Soekarno’s Advisory Council) achieved a compromise, instead of an Islamic state, 
Indonesia became secular based on Pancasila with freedom of religion guaranteed.  The 
second clause was excluded as a concession to the non-Muslim populations of the eastern 
archipelago.68  Some Muslims viewed this as a betrayal of their aspirations.  The vast 
majority of the Muslims, the non-Muslim organizations, and the military, however, 
agreed with this idea.69  This issue produced the polarization of several groups from the 
Republic, and led to the emergence of rebellion under the banner of Islam.  There were 
three Islamic resistance movements in post-independence Indonesia inspired by the wish 
for an Islamic State, and all either under the banner of the fundamentalist Darul Islam 
movement or Masyumi.70  As a result, Islam in this period became linked with the 
rebellions that opposed secular central government. 
There had been important events in this period, including the agreements that 
implied sovereignty over the whole territory of the Republic of Indonesia as we know it 
today.  The coming into being of the Republic could be tracked from agreements between 
the Netherlands and Indonesia.  The Linggardjati Agreement was finally signed by both 
sides on March 25, 1947 after being initiated in November 1946.  The agreement 
provided for the de facto recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic over the Islands 
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of Java, Sumatra, and Madura.71  This agreement was clearly a violation of Indonesia’s 
independence proclamation of August 17, 1945, which implied sovereignty over the 
entire territory of the Republic and led to  disapproval by the people.  As a consequence, 
guerilla fighting continued to expel the Dutch troops.  The offensive was, however, put to 
an end by the signing of the Renville agreement on January 17, 1948.  This truce 
agreement was subsequently violated by the Dutch before the end of December 1948.  
The Dutch armed forces carried out their second military operation within the 
Republican-controlled territory.  They arrested President Soekarno and Vice President 
Muhammad Hatta, as well as other national leaders.  
On January 28, 1949, the UN Security Council issued a resolution to establish a 
cease-fire, and demanded the release of Indonesia’s leaders.  After a series of negotiation 
efforts to end the hostilities, the Republican Government and the Dutch signed an 
agreement on the Round Table conference in The Hague on November 2, 1949, under the 
auspices of the UN.  The Dutch now recognized the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Indonesia.  On December 27, 1949 the Dutch East Indies became the sovereign Federal 
Republic of Indonesia with a federal constitution.72  Aceh was included in this agreement 
as a part of the Dutch colonial possession and as a valid sovereignty over territory that 
was then incorporated into the Dutch East Indies.73 
On the other side, Acehnese Islamist leaders realized that the nationalist leaders of 
the Republic did not share their goals, and they felt betrayed due to the rejection of Islam 
as the ideology of the state.  The PUSA leaders who ran the Aceh administration tried to 
negotiate with the central government to win provincial status for Aceh.  The 
government, through  Deputy Minister Syarifuddin Prawiranegara, responded to the 
Acehnese aspiration by issuing the Peraturan Pemerintah (Governmental Regulation) 
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No.8/Des/WKPM/1949 on January 1, 1950, which granted Aceh full autonomy as a 
separate province under Daud Beureuh’s leadership.  The autonomy allowed the local 
government to control natural resources.  The central government, however, changed its 
decision after transforming the country from a federal into a unitary state   in August 
1950, and integrating the region of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra.  This 
decision, of course, led to dissatisfaction among the Acehnese.  The abolition of Aceh’s 
provincial status and the transfer of authority to a non-Acehnese administrator, which 
was controlled by Christian Bataks in Medan, the capital city of north Sumatra, created 
various political and economic implications.74  The government tried to persuade the 
PUSA leaders to accept this change, and yet never fully achieved compromise.  Daud 
Beureuh and other ulama insisted on the establishment of an Islamic Indonesia as their 
initial moral-based struggle by utilizing another approach, joining the Darul Islam 
movement. 
Daud Beureuh declared Aceh part of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII: Indonesia 
Islamic State) on 21 September 1953, and linked to the Darul Islam (DI) rebellions that 
began in 1948 in West Java under the leadership of S.M Kartosuwiryo.  Daud Beureuh 
mobilized his followers to resist the central government by ordering his armed units to 
attack government offices and security posts to confiscate arms.75  His actions, however, 
were opposed by some ulama who stated that Daud Beureuh’s movement was bughat 
(forbidden), due to the legality of the Soekarno presidency.76  The government then 
launched a military operation to suppress the resistance to restore order.  The initial 
military operation, however, failed to curb armed rebellion as the rebels employed a 
guerilla strategy.  Daud Beureuh agreed to negotiate only if the government would give 
Aceh status on the basis of Islam.  Beureuh’s statement made it clear that that the 
Acehnese had aspired from the beginning to establish a state with a constitution based on 
Islam.  
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It was apparent that the first Acehnese rebellion sought to convert Indonesia to an 
Islamic state, but it was not a separatist movement in nature since Aceh remained an 
integral part of the Republic of Indonesia.  The DI revolt confronted the Indonesian 
government that implemented a secularist concept instead of the Islamic option.  To 
justify their violence, DI leaders depicted their enemy as kafir (infidel), indeed, Islamic 
values became the ideological backbone of almost every political movement in this 
period.  And yet, under the Soekarno administration, the original Acehnese grievances 
had gradually grown since the government became more and more centralist and 
repressive in responding to regional aspirations.  The proponents of this movement 
believed that Islamic law should have been implemented for the Indonesian state.  In 
1945, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU, Awakening of the Ulama) joined with the Masyumi in 
advocating the establishment of an Islamic state for Indonesia.77  The NU split off from 
Masyumi in 1952, and in 1960, Masyumi was disbanded and its leaders arrested and 
imprisoned.  The NU was, however, able to maintain political and tactical flexibility by 
accepting Soekarno’s authority and suspended the ultimate goal of an Islamic state in 
exchange for control over the Ministry of Religion and the protection of its political 
position in the Javanese countryside.78  Under the pre-1965 Soekarno administration, the 
department was dominated by officials from the NU.79  Its leadership finally agreed that, 
in the interest of national unity, it was acceptable for Indonesia not to be organized as an 
Islamic state following some disagreement about what the nature of the Indonesian state 
should be.80  While Masyumi was considered a traitor to the nation, the NU presented 
itself as a loyal ally to the president and the armed forces.81  The main reason for this was  
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that Pancasila could accommodate the diversity of ethnic, regional and religious elements 
that formed Indonesia.  Under Pancasila the state had an obligation to promote religiosity 
without favoring any religion in particular.82 
3. The First GAM Rebellion (1976–79) 
The debate and movement in favor of an Islamic state, whether in Aceh or 
throughout the country, were no longer accepted after the country returned to the 1945 
Constitution following the imposition of “Dekrit Presiden” (Presidential Decree) in June 
1959.  Soekarno’s authoritarian rule under Guided Democracy reaffirmed that the state’s 
ideology was Pancasila and ended the debate on the state’s ideology.  Here, as Bertrand 
argues, the centralization of political, economic and military power as the nature of 
Guided Democracy and subsequent to the New Order, gradually reduced Aceh’s special 
status.  The regime became centralized and tended to utilize military power to put down 
resistance movements, especially those that were separatist in nature.83    
After the downfall of the Soekarno regime, and following the abortive Indonesian 
Communist Party in September 1965, the New Order regime, which was dominated by 
the armed forces led by President Soeharto emerged.  The new administration became 
more centralized than the previous government especially in controlling economic 
resources.84  After almost a decade of little center-periphery conflict, Acehnese 
dissatisfaction reemerged in the early 1970s.  The discovery of a huge oil and natural gas 
reserve in North Aceh by Exxon Mobil Oil Indonesia triggered the regional sentiment as 
if all of the Aceh’s wealth were transferred to Jakarta.85  The establishment of the 
Lhokseumawe Industrial Development Zone (ZILS) in 1977 drew the arrival of non-
Acehnese workers, and at the same time, increased the presence of armed forces to secure 
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the profitable national asset.86  By the end of the 1980s, Aceh was contributing 30 
percent of the country’s total oil and gas export, making Aceh one of the main sources of 
the government’s revenue.87 
The centralized fiscal system allowed the revenues from these investments to 
move directly to foreign investors, Indonesian partners, and the central government.  
According to this centralized budgetary system, the local government received its annual 
budget from the central government.  The concept of a unitary state allowed the natural 
resources found in any province to be used to subsidize the poorer regions.  In other 
words, Aceh would support the central government as well as the other provinces’ 
expenditures.  The provincial government had no rights to tax the oil and gas revenue, 
and as a result, the provincial budget only received a small amount of the total revenue 
that was produced in the province.88  Ironically, the vast majority of the Acehnese 
remained at work in the agricultural sectors and enjoyed no significant benefits from the 
industrial complex.  The local population continued to rely on traditional agriculture and 
fishery, and their lack of education and required skills meant that most Acehnese lacked 
the ability to compete with non-Acehnese in getting jobs in the modern industrial 
compound.  The booming production of natural resources failed to increase the living 
standard of the average Acehnese.  The centralization of state power that characterized 
the New Order regime was unable to enhance Aceh’s economy in general.  As a 
consequence, the local population did not benefit from the fast-growing industrial zone 
generated by Aceh’s natural resources. 
The first GAM rebellion broke out in October 1976 under the leadership of Hasan  
Tiro who created the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which was also 
known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement).  Hasan Tiro is the son 
of the hero of Aceh’s struggle against the Dutch, Tengku Cik di Tiro who was linked to 
the Darul Islam (DI) movement in the 1950s.  But unlike the Darul Islam rebellion, the 
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GAM opposition clearly took the form of an ethno-nationalist movement, seeking 
separation from the Republic of Indonesia.  When Tiro declared the independence of 
Aceh-Sumatra in December 1976, he did not mention an Islamic state as the GAM’s 
primary goal as had been previously demanded by the Darul Islam; he changed the 
argument by exercising an ethnic-based propaganda to provoke Acehnese sentiment 
against “Javanese colonialism” (which he refers to as Indonesia) in which the Javanese 
replace the Dutchmen as emperors.89  He also paid more attention to Aceh’s natural 
wealth and said that the Acehnese should have benefited from its resources like in Brunei 
Darussalam.90  Acehnese nationalists frequently depicted Indonesian rule as colonial, and 
as an extension of Dutch rule.  For that reason, the GAM struggle was a continuation of 
opposition to the Dutch.  As Aspinall noted, the independence of Aceh, which was 
declared in 1976, was a successor state to the nineteenth-century sultanate.91  
Many Acehnese argued that Aceh was never conquered by the Dutch, or as 
Drexler stated in the common rhetoric which still exists today: “Without the contributions 
of Aceh, Indonesia might not exist today,” and “Acehnese collected enough gold to buy 
the planes [Seulawah 01 and 02],” He also said, “We gave milk and Indonesia 
reciprocated with poison.” 92  It became clear that the Acehnese people found themselves 
in a complicated dilemma when they dealt with history that was difficult to forget.  Aceh 
was, of course, conquered by the Dutch and included in Indonesia when the country 
became independent.93  Some scholars also believe that the GAM leaders’ views 
reflected  past romanticism as well as frustration in seeking international support and 
recognition, and was aimed at propaganda purposes.  The bases of Tiro’s arguments were 
apparently to construct national identity and target the Acehnese people.  Tiro effectively 
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employed rhetoric as though Aceh had been exploited by the Javanese neo-colonialism, 
and at the same time, he promoted Acehnese ethnic nationalism:  
We, the people of Aceh, Sumatra, exercising our right to self-
determination, and protecting our historic right of eminent domain to our 
fatherland, do hereby declare ourselves free and independent from all 
political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of 
the island of Java . . . The Javanese, nevertheless, are attempting to 
perpetuate colonialism which all the Western colonial powers had 
abandoned and all the world had condemned.  During these last thirty 
years the people of Aceh, Sumatra have witnessed how our fatherland has 
been exploited and driven into ruinous conditions by the Javanese neo-
colonialists: they have stolen our properties; they have robbed us from our 
livelihood; they have abused the education or our children; they have put 
our people in chains of tyranny, poverty and neglect.94  
Unfortunately, the government responded by relying heavily on military force as a 
primary tool to maintain the national integrity that had been characterized by the New 
Order regime.  There could be no compromise with separatists as the unity and integrity 
of the state was at stake.95  The rebellion had no capability to challenge the government’s 
military forces, and this led to the defeat of the rebellion.  Not only was the first rebellion 
defeated in a relatively short period of time, but it also failed to gain popular support 
especially among the Acehnese ulama, since GAM heavily promoted the secular 
platform.  The lack of the popular support, as Kell argues, was in sharp contrast to 
movements in the past, when the ulama played an important role as a distinctive and 
cohesive social group who had the capacity to challenge the state power.  Under the New 
Order regime, in contrast, they had no significant political influence due to the extreme 
centralization of state power.96  As a result, the ulama were no longer considered the 
main leaders of the Acehnese.  Although the Indonesian military operation managed to 
crush GAM, it failed to capture Hasan Tiro.  Tiro, who at that time was a local 
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businessman, and in 1950s had been the representative of Darul Islam at the United 
Nations, left Aceh in 1979.  He established a government in exile in Sweden and 
continued his struggle from there. 
4. The Second GAM Rebellion (1989–91) 
The rapid development of Aceh due to the boom of LNG between 1978 and 1989 
increased Aceh’s income per capita some 69.5 percent.97  This, ironically, generated 
social tension when tens of thousands of infrastructure workers and job-seekers from 
outside Aceh came to the province.  The influx of non-Acehnese workers led to 
competition for jobs, which became fierce and contributed to grievances that encouraged  
the 1989 reemergence of GAM.  The second GAM, a decade after the first rebellion, 
began attacking military and police posts across the region.  This time, GAM returned in 
a larger force and with better equipment than the previous time.  According to some 
estimates, the number of active members was about 750, and some 250 received military 
training in Libya.98  And yet it still lacked popular support.  Many believed that the 
second emergence was due to three factors to ensure the organization’s survival.  First, 
the Libyan government provided military training, but only training, not arms.99  GAM 
obtained arms from the Indonesian security forces whose installations they raided.100  
Second, its leadership was safe in exile where it continued its struggle for independence.  
Acehnese communities also contributed funds and safe havens in neighboring countries 
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the hope of suppressing GAM quickly generated unexpected results.  The new 
generations of GAM came from the families’ victims in Pidie, North Aceh and East 
Aceh.102   
In 1990, the military responded with heavy-handed security measures by 
launching counterinsurgency operations to curb the renewed challenge.  At this time, 
Aceh was regarded as a “military operation area” (DOM, Daerah Operasi Militer) where 
the government was able to launch military operations at will.  Many of GAM’s military 
commanders had been captured or killed.  The government’s action was successful in a 
short period of time.  By 1991, GAM had been defeated by the military.103  However, 
this operation proved counter-productive as the casualties were largely civilian.  Many 
believe that the prolonged use of violence failed to address the main problem, and in fact, 
the Acehnese turned against the military and the Indonesian government.  During ten 
years of military operations, thousands of Acehnese lost their lives.  According to a 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in 2001, in late 1998, the group 
documented 871 people killed by the army and 387 missing who were later reported 
dead.  More than 500 were under the status “disappeared” and were never found.  Tens of 
thousands of Acehnese were imprisoned and tortured in military camps.  In addition, 
hundreds of documented rape cases and various human rights violations affected many 
Acehnese until the end of the military operations (DOM) in August 1998.104  This was 
clear evidence that the brutal military operations only increased extreme dislike for the 
government and the military, and contributed directly to the third GAM emergence in 
1999. 
5. The Third GAM Rebellion (1999–2005) 
The downfall of the Soeharto administration in 1989 marked the transition from 
authoritarian regime to democracy.  Soeharto’s successor, President Habibie, launched a 
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breakthrough by offering the East Timorese a choice between separation from or 
integration into the Republic, and the Timorese ultimately managed to gain total 
separation from Indonesia through a referendum in 1999.  Habibie’s decision increased 
secessionist activities in Aceh, and also brought a response from student groups in Aceh 
that established organizations such as SIRA (acronym of the Independent Voters of 
Aceh) that demanded a similar referendum.  When East Timor eventually separated from 
Indonesia, it created a massive demonstration across Aceh, and according to some 
estimates, more than 500,000 Acehnese gathered in the capital city of Banda Aceh in 
1999 to support the referendum.  To pacify the tension in Aceh, Jakarta responded by 
admitting that serious human rights had taken place in Aceh in the previous decade.  
President Habibie and Armed Forces Chief Wiranto separately admitted the wrongdoings 
committed by the military and apologized for the military’s human rights violations.  
Some senior military officers disagreed with the idea of the military asking for 
forgiveness.105  Nevertheless, General Wiranto finally declared a withdrawal of the 
military and marked the end of the DOM era in 1998. 
President Abdurahman Wahid, after assuming power through election in 1999, 
continued the political dialog, and promoted the Aceh conflict as an international issue.  
An agreement for a Humanitarian Pause was signed on 12 May 2000 in Geneva, and 
officially ended in February 2001.  This policy, however, did not impact GAM’s activity; 
in fact, GAM used this agreement to increase its strength.  The agreement failed to stop 
the violence, and according to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, by mid-2001, 
the number of GAM fighters had increased dramatically to about 3,000 with more assault 
rifles and grenade launchers, and controlled 80 percent of Aceh’s villages.106  GAM’s 
arsenal had grown both in quality and quantity since the start of the Humanitarian Pause.  
GAM also successfully recruited its members by force initially, but over time it also 
persuaded the children of people who had been killed or tortured by the military under 
the DOM to avenge their parents.  Ross cited from the Jakarta Post reported on July 30,  
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2000, the GAM’s new recruits were children of the DOM victims.107  Rebel attacks in 
Aceh escalated toward the end of Wahid’s presidency and forced him to authorize 
harsher military action against the rebels.108 
In July 2001, President Wahid was impeached and replaced by his vice president, 
Megawati Soekarnoputri.  She took a harsher approach by forcing GAM to accept 
autonomy as a framework before proceeding to further talks; otherwise the military 
would launch operations on the village of Cot Trieng, one of the GAM strongholds, in 
November 2002.109  As a result, on 9 December 2002, GAM agreed to conclude a 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) with the government.  However, the 
agreement failed to lead to a compromise.  GAM wanted independence while the 
government offered an autonomy which was considered “the least desirable option,” by 
GAM, and led to the collapse of the agreement in May 2003.110 
D. SUMMARY   
Since the time when Aceh was under the reign of the sultanate, it has played a key 
role in shaping faith-identity on the world’s Islamic stage by depicting itself as a Serambi 
Mekkah (Verandah of Mecca).  During that period, Aceh also faced extensive foreign 
entities either in peaceful trade with merchants of many nationalities, or hostile 
encounters with the European powers.  During the pre-colonial era, Aceh was legendary 
for its long history of devout Islam and resistance to external rules.  An 1824 Anglo-
Dutch treaty placed Aceh in the Dutch sphere of influence, and then the Dutch quickly 
took control of Sumatra.  In the subsequent four decades of bloody war with the Dutch, 
the uleebalang who gradually became supporters of Dutch colonialism, had created a 
crucial change in Acehnese society.  The tension between uleebalang and the ulama 
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escalated before the invasion by the Japanese in 1942, and months after the Japanese 
surrender in August 1945.  The emergence of ulama belonged to the All-Aceh Union of 
Ulama (PUSA) led by Daud Beureuh as Acehnese leadership through social revolution 
resulted in the Acehnese becoming increasingly Islamic in their resistance ever since.  In 
the revolutionary period, Aceh proved to be one of the toughest Republic strongholds, 
forcing the Dutch to stay away from the region.  The problems, however, came after 
some Acehnese demands were not able to be fulfilled by the central government.  Despite 
some national government policies that were implemented, the problems persisted.  First, 
the government revoked Aceh’s provincial status in 1951 after the adoption of the unitary 
state for the entire country in 1950.  This policy impacted Aceh’s provincial status 
economically, politically and socially since Aceh came under the leadership of the 
predominantly Christian Bataks in Medan.  Second, the PUSA ulama felt they were 
betrayed by the Republican government due to the implementation of the secular concept 
for the Indonesian state. 
In 1953, Daud Bereuh responded to the government decision by launching a 
revolt under the banner of the Darul Islam movement.  This rebellion, however, was not 
secessionist in nature, but rather a movement to force the government to implement 
Islamic law for all of Indonesia.  The insurgency was subsequently put to an end by both 
military and political measures.  The military actions, however, not only increased 
separatist sentiment, but also generated various violations of human rights by the soldiers.  
Despite the Darul Islam rebellion, it was clearly evident that the Acehnese demonstrated 
their loyalty to the Republic.  The government then granted Aceh a special status, Daerah 








education after Daud Beureuh surrendered in 1962.111  When Aceh came under the New 
Order regime in the mid-1960s, the special status had little meaning as the government 
became more centralized than during the previous regime.  The government never 
fulfilled its promise since Aceh remained a special region in name only.  Furthermore, it 
became common for the central government to appoint the governors to run the 
provinces.  
The discovery of oil and gas in North Aceh in 1971 contributed almost one-third 
of the total national export making Aceh a reliable source of national revenue.  The 
industrial complexes that were established soon after oil and gas were discovered led to 
the increasing arrival of Javanese officials and non-Acehnese workers in the Aceh region.  
The local population surrounding the complex saw that the non-Acehnese ethnic groups 
became richer, while the locals had nothing but toxic waste and pollution.  Lack of 
education and skills contributed to the failure of the Acehnese in the competition to get 
jobs in their own region.  The social gap between the non-Acehnese and the locals 
became increasingly wider and deeper.  A government unresponsive to these social issues 
led to the emergence of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) taking over the government’s 
responsibility.  Hasan Tiro led the GAM, but this time was seeking total independence 
from the Republic, a clear distinction from the Darul Islam in terms of its primary goal.  
The government of Indonesia heavily employed military measures to destroy the revolt.  
The military then successfully defeated GAM in the 1970s, and yet apparently failed to 
address the root causes of the Aceh conflict, and in fact, the feeling of being Indonesian 
had gradually faded away.  
The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 marked a different way to address 
the Acehnese conflict.  The Acehnese struggle broadened into a civil movement that 
asked for a popular referendum following President Habibie’s offer to the East Timorese 
to either integrate or separate from Indonesia through a referendum.  Aceh, in contrast, 
had a different history of integration than that of East Timor; Aceh was always part of the 
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Indonesian territory as stated in the Round Table Conference Agreement in 1949.  The 
1949 agreement had been very important since it provided for a transfer of sovereignty 
from the Dutch East Indies to Indonesia while Aceh was the Dutch colonial possession.  
Habibie attempted to resolve the Aceh conflict through negotiation and suspended 
military actions and revoked DOM status (Military Operation Zone).  His successor, 
President Abdurrahman Wahid, as well as President Megawati, offered negotiations, but 
when the negotiations failed, they both relied on military options.  They repeated   
Soeharto’s authoritarian style of suppressing the rebellions that increased Acehnese 
resentments and proved counter-productive.  From this point, we can see that since 
Indonesia declared independence in 1945, the Acehnese have never received assistance of   
any kind from the Republican government, yet their struggle was in the name of 
Indonesia.  Ironically, the Acehnese sacrificed a lot for Indonesia, but in exchange for 
nothing.  Here, as Anthony Reid put it, Indonesia has needed Aceh far more than Aceh 
has needed Indonesia.112  
                                                 
112 Anthony Reid, “Colonial Transformation: a Bitter Legacy,” in Verandah of Violence ed. by 




III. MILITARY APPROACHES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Mao Tse-Tung has described guerillas like “the fish in a water.” The water can 
live by itself, but not the fish.113  The Chinese defeated the Japanese Imperial army 
through a combination of popular support and guerilla tactics.  Mao’s successful strategy 
to drive the Japanese imperial army out of China was widely recognized, and became an 
inspiration for many scholars as to how guerilla warfare should be conducted.  Using this 
point we can also provide strategies on how to defeat guerilla bands by separating “fish” 
from “water.” From the previous chapter, we can see that the rebellion in Aceh came and 
went, depending upon popular support.  It is widely known that counter-insurgency and 
insurgency operations treated the population as the center of gravity; this assertion 
represents a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people rather than a struggle for 
territory or against military forces.  From this insight, counterinsurgency is a political and 
social problem rather than a military one.114 
Although Mao had no direct influence on the Aceh rebellions, his thinking and 
concepts in carrying out a protracted popular war based on a guerilla campaign could be 
an inspiration for every guerilla band around the world.  In addition, Mao’s guerilla 
strategy was considered one of the most successful guerilla strategies of all time.115  In 
the case of the Aceh conflict, the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy employed by the 
Indonesian military proved ineffective to defeat the insurgents militarily, or at least 
needed a long time to achieve victory over them.  GAM, on the other hand, was unable to 
defeat the Indonesian military.  The inability to win this war brought the two sides to the 
negotiating table and made a compromise settlement possible.  The government required 
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almost three decades before concluding a peace agreement that granted Aceh wide-
ranging autonomous power within the Republic of Indonesia.  Based on this assumption, 
I will evaluate what went wrong and what went right in utilizing COIN strategies.  In this 
chapter, I will discuss the success and failure of the military operations employed by the 
Indonesian military to suppress GAM.  I will also evaluate the COIN strategy employed 
against the first GAM rebellion from 1976 to the 1980s when the military was able to 
destroy the rebellion in a relatively short period of time before it reemerged a decade 
later.  McCormick’s diamond model is used to measure the success and failure of the 
counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. 
B. COUNTER-INSURGENCY   
1. McCormick’s Model   
Many scholars have developed models for understanding insurgency and counter-
insurgency (COIN) to deal with the armed conflicts that might take place in many 
countries.  One model that has been developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick, the Head of 
the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, is the “Mystic 
Diamond,” or “Diamond Model.” It involves four key elements or players that 
demonstrate the strategies for their interactions.  The interactions, as shown in Figure 1 
and Figure 3, place the population at the center of gravity (COG).  The model develops a 
symmetrical view of the required actions for contestants to succeed.   For this reason, 
there is a direct correlation between the success and failure of the implementation of 
insurgency and COIN strategies, which are determined by the degree that the forces 
follow the model.  Another study by McCormick et al. will be beneficial to describe an 
ineffective COIN strategy employed by the Indonesian military to destroy GAM.  How 
GAM developed its ability to make a comeback later in time, after being defeated by the 






a. A Strong Actor, a Weak Win 
It is widely known that guerilla warfare can be protracted for decades 
depending upon the abilities of the guerillas to employ hit-and-run attacks against 
security forces.  Attack the enemy when ready and hide if the enemy far stronger.  When 
Indonesia was under the occupation of the Dutch, the newly established Indonesian army 
fought against Dutch colonialism; the indigenous army and the population lived in the 
jungles and mountains to conduct guerilla warfare.  After gaining its independence in 
1945, Indonesia had to face several rebellions from either separatists in (rebellions) or 
revolts (to topple the government).  Since independence, the military has successfully 
fought rebels and brought them to the recognition of the government.  Based on the 
experiences in the past in conducting guerilla tactics, the counter-insurgency strategies 
employed by the military since the early independence of the Republic proved effective 
and decisive enough to curb the rebellions, which also employed guerilla tactics.  In the 
case of Aceh and East Timor, however, the military had more difficulty.  These 
exceptions require a good explanation.   
As McCormick, Horton and Harrison note, most internal wars end on the 
battlefield and only a small number end at the negotiating table.116  I will thus focus on 
how the first GAM rebellion was resolved by force and subsequently at the negotiating 
table.  To demonstrate the endgame dynamic of the first GAM rebellion, this part 
provides an explanation of how it took place.  McCormick’s study showed that there have 
been some 300 internal conflicts similar to that of Aceh that were initiated since the end 
of World War II.  More than 80 percent of these internal wars were concluded on the 
battlefield, and only 20 percent were resolved by agreement.  See the statistic presented 
in Table 1.117  
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Table 1.   Insurgent Conflict Since 1945 
We can see that there are 276 cases of insurgent-state dyads since 1945, 
which include 44 ongoing insurgent-state conflicts and 234 resolved insurgent-state 
conflicts.  In their study of wars between insurgents and states, they found that the states 
have a greater chance of victory.  The state’s objective is to regain power while the 
insurgent’s is to expand popular support and defeat or displace the state.  In the case of 
GoI-GAM conflict, the rebellion lacked the capability to defeat the military.  This was 
due to the fact that the rebellion did not involve the entire population of the vast 
archipelago, but only some parts of the Aceh province.  Unlike the previous war, in the 
revolutionary era, when the much of the population fought against the Dutch occupation, 
this type of localized guerilla war cannot be categorized as revolutionary war,119 since 
this war did not engage the bulk of the population, or even a significant part of the 
population, against the military forces or the Indonesian authority.120  In addition, the 
TNI had a force advantage since the beginning of the conflict.  GAM, on the other hand, 
needed to develop its strength in order to challenge the military.  In order to win, GAM 
needed to expand its size over time, and as an indicator, the conflict between the two 
                                                 
118 McCormick et al., “Things Fall Apart.” The use of the term “insurgent-state dyad” is for counting 
purposes. 
119 The word of “Revolutionary War,” refers to the revolution of the American colonies against Great 
Britain; 1775–1783, In this case, the revolution means an attempt to overthrow a government by those who 
are governed. GAM, of course, had no ability to do that. 





would escalate.  But, perhaps GAM did not need to win; rather it only needed to prevent 
the military from winning.  A state wins, however, as McCormick et al. argue when the 
insurgent group is defeated or displaced by a state, or is no longer a significant combat 
force.121  Thus, to keep this from happening, GAM required popular support.  But how 
did the Indonesian military defeat the first GAM rebellion?  
In 1962, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) successfully crushed the 
Darul Islam rebellion, after a decade of trying, by employing a combination of counter-
insurgency and negotiation.  The first GAM rebellion was initiated in 1976 after Hasan 
Tiro declared Acehnese independence, but it lasted a relatively short period of time.   The 
latest revolt was the continuation of the 1976 rebellion and had no direct connection to 
the Darul Islam movement.  Since the first rebellion had no wide popular support, the 
military was able to fight GAM directly.  At the time, its emergence was relatively small 
and underfinanced, and it was easily suppressed by the military.  GAM members had 
only limited places to hide amongst the population due to lack of popular support and 
largely relied on the jungles and mountains.  It was thus difficult for GAM to avoid the 
government troops who were well-trained and well-equipped for jungle operations.  
GAM’s strength (1976–79) was only 25 to 200 active members, but it gradually increased 
its number to be some 200–750 in the 1990s.122  In 2001, according to some estimations 
of the strength of GAM’s military wing, AGAM, it had jumped from about 15,000 to 
27,000 combatants, but they were lightly armed with 1,000 to 1,500 modern firearms, a 
few grenade launchers, and some rocket propelled grenades and mortars.123  On the other 
hand, there were around 10,000 non-organic military forces in about fifteen battalions 
while some 7,000 Brimob (Mobile Brigade/police paramilitary) troops were stationed in 
the province; in fact, the number of troops reached about 30,000 in about eighteen TNI 
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battalion-sized units to augment the police strength.124  In an asymmetric conflict like 
this, TNI was clearly the stronger actor, both in numbers and in combat capacity. 
If strength implies success in this conflict, GAM should have been 
defeated.  In order to be safe, GAM should have avoided direct confrontation with the 
Indonesian military.  At this stage, GAM had no capacity to engage head-to-head with the 
military.  Instead of avoiding the Indonesian military, in fact, GAM erroneously attacked 
a “soft target” in which one American engineer of Bechtel was killed, and others were 
injured in October 1977.125  This attack, of course, sacrificed GAM’s image both locally 
and internationally.  The Indonesian military began to hunt them down.  As a result, in 
the early 1980s, most of its top leaders, including the first Prime Minister Muchtar Hasbi, 
were either killed or captured or had fled into exile.126  The GAM leader  Hasan Tiro, 
was shot in the leg in an ambush, and fled to Malaysia.  He has subsequently moved to 
Stockholm, Sweden, where he has lived since 1980.  The winner of this game was the 
government military, and as shown in Table 1, the vast majority of counter-insurgency 
operations are concluded on the battlefield.  
And yet, it was apparent that GAM was not totally defeated by the 
military. In McCormick’s terminology, the military only achieved a “weak win” since the 
military as a strong actor succeeded in defeating GAM, but had no ability to extensively 
expand control over the political space.127  As a result, GAM had the ability to reorganize 
itself by using its political grip to make a comeback later in time.  When GAM made its 
comeback in 1998, with better military training and equipment, it was still difficult for 
GAM to directly challenge the military.  Instead of attacking military personnel, GAM 
began targeting, again, “soft targets” such as local government officials and non-
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Acehnese settlers and destroyed commercial and public properties in the Lhokseumawe 
area.  The government easily suppressed GAM in 1991 through counter-insurgency 
operations; many of GAM’s military commanders were killed or captured.  But still 
GAM was not totally defeated, and it reemerged in 1999 with widespread popular 
support.  The next question is why and how GAM reemerged with better equipment and 
wider popular support? Understanding how this occurred can give us insight into what 
factors were favorable for GAM to reemerge, and at the same time demonstrate why the 
military became increasingly unpopular in the eyes of Acehnese. 
b. Diamond Model 
It is not that hard to answer the questions above.  Using lessons learned 
from the first rebellion, GAM realized that the most important part of its struggle relied 
upon the population.  While GAM paid much more attention to gaining popular support, 
the military moved in the opposite direction.  GAM was able to grow from a small 
guerilla band to a movement that successfully controlled most of the province, including 
the establishment of local governments through their shadow civil service structure, 
making them a serious challenge to the government.  As the separatist movement 
escalated, the central government tried to suppress it with full-scale military operations.  
This strategy to attack GAM military strength directly proved ineffective over time.  This 
was due to the bitter consequences of the separation of East Timor after its rebellion was 
internationalized.  The government then found its own way to solve the Aceh problem 
without intervention from foreign communities by relying heavily on a military solution 
in the hopes of defeating GAM as quickly as possible.  This increased the degree of 
violence between the two.  Instead of defeating GAM swiftly and decisively, the military 
operations generated human rights abuses and drew international condemnation.  During 
this stage, GAM tried to internationalize its case by any means, in the hopes of gaining 
the same result as that of East Timor.128 
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As is mentioned in Chapter I (see Figure 1), the diamond model comprises 
four legs, which describe the interactions of the government, people, insurgents, and  
international actors, with the people as the center of gravity (COG), which should have 
been contested by both sides.  The figure below provides a more detailed version than the 











Figure 3.   Diamond Model 
The focus of the counter-insurgency operation must be the center of 
gravity, or the population.  Most insurgent wars are internal wars fought for control of a 
territory; each side has the same population as a center of gravity (see leg 1).  The 
purpose of both the political and military activities of the war is to influence the 
perception of the population.130  The strategic objective of the COIN operations should 
be to protect civilians while destroying the insurgents and strengthening the 
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government.131  In the case of the Aceh conflict, however, the military apparently failed 
to maintain its dominance over the rebellion for a long period of time.  GAM has always 
been able to come back again, with even greater popular support over time.  
In order to gain popular support, the TNI should attack and weaken the 
strength of GAM without damaging its own support.  Since supporters of both sides 
blend together in the population, the acts of brutality conducted by the military might 
alienate the neutral portions of the population.  The political dimension of insurgency is 
the key to its success.  Whether an insurgency will rise or fall depends on its ability to 
convert the population to its side.  Hence the TNI should concentrate its efforts to prevent 
this from happening by making the population a center of gravity to win the hearts and 
minds of the people.  In the Aceh conflict, it was clear that the TNI did not take that into 
consideration.  For example, from 1976 to 1989, GAM’s membership and support base 
was limited in numbers and capacity.  Its members initially originated from Pidie, a 
village where Tiro came from.  Most of its members were either the victims of DOM or 
from the districts where there was inequality and exploitation of oil and gas by the central 
government.132  The government strategy in dealing with the insurgents relied heavily on 
military operations, which also created collateral damage, as the casualties were mostly 
civilian.  Thus it was thus not surprising that the Acehnese’s hearts and minds turned to 
GAM.  As a result, GAM gained massive popular support, as was evident in a huge 
demonstration in which hundreds of thousands of people took to the street in the 
provincial capital, Banda Aceh, in 1999, demanding Acehnese independence.  
The military strategies to deal with GAM, however, remained the same.  
To separate GAM from the population, the military cut the logistical and communication 
lines before destroying GAM’s military command and civilian infrastructures (see leg 2).  
Because GAM also established a shadow government, or civilian structures, it was not 
easy for the military to separate the insurgents from the population, loosen the grip over 
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them, and win the hearts and minds of the people.  GAM could easily blend into the 
population, not wearing uniforms or carrying weapons.  The security forces became 
frustrated searching for and locating GAM members and this situation led to brutal 
treatment of the local population.  This was due to the difficulties security forces faced in 
distinguishing GAM from ordinary Acehnese.  The security forces began terrorizing the 
population in order to deter them from supporting GAM.  During the period of Operasi 
Terpadu (Integrated Operation) in 2003–2004, the beating and torturing of unarmed 
civilians and the burning of villages were still taking place.133  Instead of winning the 
hearts and minds of the people, again the government failed to address the primary issues 
of the Aceh conflict.    
It is important to know how GAM has been able to defend itself against 
the stronger opponent for about three decades.  As noted, Arrequin-Toft’s thesis argues 
that the governments (the big actors) lose insurgency wars if and when they choose the 
wrong strategy vis-à-vis the strategy of the insurgents (see leg 3).134  Toft argues that the 
insurgents’ goal, if they take an indirect approach, is to destroy not the capacity, but the 
will of the attacker.  However, in the Aceh conflict, this does not mean that the military is 
expected to win when they employ the correct strategy of barbarism, which is defined as 
the systematic violation of the laws of war to achieve a military or political objective.  
This definition includes destructive actions against noncombatants such as rape, murder 
and torture to destroy the insurgent’s will and capacity to fight.135  This is due to the fact 
that noncombatant casualties would sacrifice the military’s reputation and attract 
international condemnation. 
GAM needs two elements to survive; they are physical sanctuary (e.g., 
mountain, forest or jungle), and supportive population (e.g., logistic and intelligent as 
well as hiding places).  GAM cannot defeat the government armed forces militarily using 
a direct approach; therefore GAM will seek to destroy the government armed forces’ will 
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to fight by employing indirect approaches.  Since asymmetric was the nature of the Aceh 
conflict, GAM employed an “indirect approach” to avoid massive contact with the TNI 
except in circumstances of overwhelming advantages (see leg 3).  The GAM strategy also 
stressed the importance of having the intelligence advantages of the TNI and its 
strategies.  Unlike GAM that could attack TNI by employing techniques such as hit-and-
run and ambush to generate great casualties, the TNI could not attack GAM directly since 
GAM fighters were able to blend into the population.  For these reasons, the war tends to 
be protracted, and GAM gains a time advantage.  In a war like this, according to Toft, 
success is measured by the ability to prosecute a protracted conflict against a superior 
enemy.  GAM has an opportunity to win the war, and the government could possibly lose 
the war.    
Aceh was different from East Timor in terms of its integration into the 
Republic.  Aceh was part of the state of Indonesia ever since its declaration in 1945.  
Most states, therefore, did not support Aceh’s demand for independence, as it would 
affect the stability of Indonesia as well as neighboring countries.  Just as GAM needed 
the support of the local people of Aceh, it also needed the support of the international 
community (see leg 5) to internationalize their struggle to achieve independence.  The 
acts of “internationalization” were intended to put pressure on Indonesia so that GAM 
was recognized as a legitimate freedom fighter for Aceh’s independence (see leg 4).  The 
direct international support for GAM came from Libya, from 1986 to 1989, in the form of 
military training.136  Among the international supporters were Sweden and Norway, who 
gave political sanctuary to GAM’s top political leadership.137  In order to sustain its 
struggle, GAM had to be able to finance itself since there were only a few supporters of 
its struggle.  GAM relied on donations from Acehnese communities in neighboring 
countries such as Malaysia or Thailand.  Standard weapons were obtained from either 
domestic or foreign sources.  The domestic sources of weapons were from Indonesian 
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armed forces and the seizure of weapons from attacking army and police posts.138  
Internationally, weapons came largely from Cambodia.139  The archipelago’s porous 
borders made any attempts to prevent weapon smuggling more difficult.  Although 
hundreds or thousands of weapons were intercepted at sea, the number of weapons that 
actually reached their destination has always been questioned.  Another important aspect 
of COIN strategy was to cut GAM communication links between Aceh and the GAM 
leaders in exile; to get in touch with their leaders, GAM’s field commanders widely 
employed satellite phones (see leg 4).  One of the reasons for GAM’s toughness was that 
it was able to establish its headquarters in Sweden, which was far from Indonesia, and 
communicate with GAM’s military leaders in Aceh through satellite devices.140  If the 
military, in attempting to intercept weapons smuggling, could guard the archipelago’s sea 
borders by using naval warships, it found it very difficult to disrupt these satellite 
communications (see leg 4).141 
2. Military Operation under the Suharto Era (1977–1998) 
The government was able to neutralize the first GAM rebellion in 1977, but the 
group managed to renew its activities in 1989.  Indonesian security forces during the 
period of 1990–1998, designated Aceh a Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation 
Zone, or DOM).  This era was marked by a series of attacks launched by hundreds of 
Libyan-trained GAM guerillas.  They raided military and police posts, confiscated dozens 
of automatic weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition in 1990.  As GAM 
attacked the military directly and openly, GAM used the direct strategy of facing the 
military head–to-head.  The McCormick model suggests that in asymmetric warfare like 
this, GAM’s inferior strength did not match up with the TNI.  GAM was defeated by the 
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military (see leg 3).  As a result, President Soeharto ordered the military to destroy GAM 
in 1990, and the military had an opportunity to win the war.  Unfortunately, the order was 
given without any form of written presidential decree; it was only given verbally.142  
International organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that over one 
thousand civilians were killed in the first three years of the operation.  Tens of thousands  
of Acehnese were imprisoned and tortured in military camps, rape cases were reportedly 
widespread, and various human rights violations were also recorded until the end of 
DOM in 1998.143 
Although the backbone of GAM’s struggle in this period was mostly Libyan-trained 
fighters, GAM still faced an arms shortage.  Initially, the government stated that the situation 
in Aceh was a purely criminal incident perpetrated by dozens of people including military 
men.144  But when the insurgents began increasing military attacks in order to obtain as 
many weapons as possible, it became a serious concern to the central government.  The 
governor of Aceh during that period, Ibrahim Hasan, was concerned about the deteriorating 
situation and asked the military to deal with GAM.  The military personnel stationed in Aceh 
were some 6,000 organic troops under two Subregional Military Commands (Korem).  In 
order to suppress GAM quickly, the government additionally deployed an estimated 6,000 
troops, including army special forces (Kopassus), bringing the total number to 12,000.145  
The military began establishing Komando Pelaksana Operasi, Kolaksops (Field Operation 
Command), and divided the Aceh province into three areas of responsibility.  In addition, 
the military set up some additional task forces, such as intelligence and marine units, to 
isolate and destroy the insurgents.  By 1990, the massive military operation under the 
code name Operasi Jaring Merah (Operation Red Net), and initially designated it to 
destroy the rebellion within six months, but it was not over until 1998.146 
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The government labeled GAM the Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (Security 
Disturbing Movement; GPK); in other words, the government attempted to criminalize 
GAM and did not recognize GAM as a politically motivated movement, but rather as a 
military issue.  The government refused to acknowledge that the counter-insurgency 
operation was intended to destroy a separatist movement.147  In fact, the government 
tended to deal with GAM by utilizing military forces.  Some criticized this policy by 
saying that the New Order response to rebellion in Aceh was the politics of generalization 
and stigmatization due to no clear distinction between insurgents and Acehnese.148  
Insurgents were frequently stated to be “everywhere” in the population, and as a result, 
the military tended to see all Acehnese as potential GAM members.149  It was not 
surprising that thousands of Acehnese became victims of the military operations.  One of 
the strategies of the so-called “shock therapy,” such as the dumping of unidentified 
corpses in roadside and public areas, was commonly known to be conducted by the 
security forces during the Soeharto administration.150  Another strategy was Operasi 
Pagar Betis (Operation Fence of Legs) in 1991; this operation employed village people to 
sweep through a certain area to capture GAM members.  Some criticized this as 
disregarding international law, which forbids the direct use of civilians in combat 
situations.  Although the government was able to reduce the GAM’s strength 
significantly by killing, capturing, or forcing GAM leaders into exile, the Soeharto 
regime clearly failed to handle the root causes of the Aceh conflict.  These strategies 
obviously did not treat Aceh’s population as the centre of gravity as suggested on the 
Diamond model. 
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3. Military Operations after the Suharto Era (1998–2004) 
a. Habibie Era (1998–1999) 
After the Soeharto regime collapsed, Vice-President Habibie became his 
successor in 1998.  He held office for just a short period of time from 1998–1999 and 
during those years, the military became the target of criticism especially in connection 
with various human rights abuses in the past.  The fall of Soeharto and the rise of Habibie 
was a historic event intensely monitored by both the local and international public.  The 
political change in Jakarta affected the Acehnese whereas the stories about the human 
rights abuses that they suffered for long periods of time were widely reported by the 
media.  This period was marked by the unprecedented freedom of the press, which helped  
spread information about human rights situation in Aceh.  GAM was able to 
internationalize the abuse of the military operations.  GAM managed to depict the 
military as a human rights violator to the international community (see leg 4).  Human 
rights became a sensitive issue for the government due to international condemnation on 
how the government of Indonesia handled the East Timor issue. 
In response, President Habibie decided to withdraw non-organic military 
forces from the province and declared the end of the Military Operation Zone (DOM) 
status for Aceh.  President Habibie also made a public apology for what had happened in 
the past.  Although without being officially declared, the imposition of DOM (the order 
was given verbally by President Soeharto in 1990), the commander-in-chief, General 
Wiranto, publicly apologized, and “lifted” the Aceh status of DOM on August 7, 1998.  
He began withdrawing non-organic troops from Aceh and yet his decision did not 
immediately pacify the province.  Despite the official lifting of DOM, the violence 
escalated, and in fact GAM intensified its activities beyond military targets such as 
attacking Javanese migrants and suspected Indonesian sympathizers, destroying 
government buildings, and driving civilians and government employees out of Aceh.151  
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The GAM actions were intended to undermine the effectiveness of the government 
apparatus in Aceh province (see leg 2).  This situation forced the government to maintain 
the presence of the security forces in the province and continue a series of operations to 
restore order, which was led by the police. 
b. Abdurahman Wahid Era (1999–2001) 
President Abdurrahman Wahid assumed power through a general election 
in 1999.  The conflict in Aceh continued to deteriorate as the clashes between security 
forces and GAM intensified.  Despite the increasing security issues, efforts to put an end 
to the conflict though political solutions surfaced.  The government began pursuing non-
military efforts to foster international support by inviting the third party to assist the 
government, or at least indicate that the government had the will to resolve the conflict 
peacefully (see leg 5).  As a result, the Wahid administration initiated negotiations by 
contacting the Henry Dunant Center (HDC), and this resulted in the first talks between 
the Government of Indonesia, represented by Hasan Wirajuda, the Indonesian 
ambassador to the UN and GAM leader, Hasan Tiro, in Switzerland on January 27, 2000.  
Both sides defended their positions; GAM representatives repeatedly stated that they 
wanted total independence, and Indonesian leaders insisted that negotiations had to occur 
within the framework of the unitary state of Indonesia.  President Abdurrahman himself, 
then proceeded to meet with the HDC officials on January 30 and generated the signing 
of a “Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh,” on May 12.  Since this was 
not a cease-fire, the agreement aimed to allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
and the conflict still continued in Aceh.  In fact, armed clashes, disappearances, killings 
and other forms of violence became common, and GAM and the military blamed each 
other for the escalated hostilities.  The failure of the agreement was caused by several 
problems: the military as well as the political elites, since the beginning of the process 
expressed disagreement, saying that the agreement would put GAM on the same level 
and equal to the TNI and Polri (Indonesian National Police).  GAM, on the other hand, 




collect the so-called “pajak Nanggroe” (taxes), in areas under its control.152  For this 
reason, the local military commanders proposed that if the agreement failed to stop 
violence, then a civil emergency could be declared and military operation would be 
implemented.153 
It was apparent that the agreement did not lie in firm foundations as it had 
during the negotiations, as GAM insisted on pursuing independence for Aceh and 
escalated the violence by attacking military and police posts, especially around  Exxon 
Mobile, which led to the closure of the plant while the government, and especially the 
military, wanted to defeat GAM militarily.  As a result, President Abdurrahman Wahid 
issued a Presidential Instruction (Inpres) in April 2001 that authorized an operation 
known as the Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum (Operation for 
Restoring Security and Upholding the Law).  In contrast to previous operations, this one 
aimed at dealing with the Aceh problem in a comprehensive way.  Some examples of the 
operations were Operasi Wibawa I-II (Operation Authority) in 1998–1999, Operation 
Sadar Rencong I-III (Operation Rencong Awareness) in 1999–2000, and Operasi Cinta 
Meunasah (Operation Love the Mosque) in 2000–2001.  Now the nature of the security 
operations had changed from that of a military operation to a campaign to restore security 
and public order.  This new law allowed the division of responsibility between the 
military and the police in Aceh.  The military was only a supporting role.  It was apparent 
that the newly elected government attempted to correct the negative impact of military 
operations in the past, and intended to resolve the Aceh problem by using civil 
approaches.  Although the restore order operation was designated to be led by the police, 
in reality the military still dominated the COIN operations but were under the umbrella of 
a police-led operation.154  
These operations comprised four combat elements from TNI and the 
police.  The first element was the police and the second element was the army territorial 
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commands.  The third element was Kostrad, Kopassus and a Rajawali (Eagle) Force, as 
special counter-insurgency units.  The fourth element was the Marine Corps and the air 
force’s Special Forces (Paskhas).  Although officially the operation was headed by the 
police, in reality, due to lack of training, manpower and equipment to deal with the 
insurgents, the operations relied on the military.  In this era, the excessive use of force in 
defeating the insurgency was still dominated by non-military measures such as a 
negotiated political settlement.  At the same time, GAM intensified its activities by 
attacking not only the security forces, but also the targeting and killing of civilian, 
especially Javanese, migrants.  Between May 1999 and April 2000, the highest  
displacement took place when some 160,000–180,000, mostly Javanese migrants, were 
displaced from five areas within Aceh such as North Aceh, East Aceh, Central Aceh, 
West Aceh, and Pidie.155 
c. Megawati Era (2001–2004) 
Following the impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, 
Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri assumed the presidency.  Under her 
administration, a military presence in Aceh became permanently established.  Despite 
some disagreement among the Acehnese, she approved the re-establishment of a regional 
military command (Kodam) for the province, and named it Kodam Iskandar Muda.  She 
also continued to pursue a non-military solution by resuming talks with GAM in Sweden, 
and reached a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in December 2002.  Although 
COHA was able to reduce the number of people killed, the sporadic clashes continued to 
occur.  In fact, GAM attacked the Joint Security Committee offices in March 2003, 
indicating that COHA failed to achieve peace in Aceh.  President Megawati subsequently 
issued the Presidential Decree (Kepres) 28/2003, imposing martial law across Aceh, and 
began the so-called Operasi Terpadu (Integrated Operation) to take firm action against 
GAM, which increasingly grew stronger within the province.  The decree marked the 
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transfer of authority from the civilian governor to the local military commander, in this 
case, the Pangdam (the regional military commander) who acted as Penguasa Darurat 
Militer or PDMD (regional martial law administrator), meaning that the military was the 
highest government authority in Aceh. The Megawati administration still believed that 
military operations were the keys for success in conquering GAM. The nature of the 
counter-insurgency operations in this period were to face the GAM military by reducing  
GAM military strength in the hope that it could be defeated militarily. 
Based on this decree, the military began launching a massive military 
operation.  Many believe that in terms of the number of troops, this was the biggest 
offensive since the East Timor invasion in 1975.  Unlike the 1990s military operations, 
which were without a legal presidential decree, this Operasi Terpadu enjoyed strong 
support from the parliament, all the political leaders, and the non-Acehnese Indonesian 
public in general.156  Although, the operation was expected to last only six months, as 
authorized by the decree, its extension was unlimited.  The operation, however, was not 
immune from criticism.  The International Crisis Group (ICG) stated that the military 
criteria for success in this effort seemed to be the number of GAM killed, arrested, and 
surrendered, and the number of weapons confiscated.157  By the end of the first six 
months of the operation, the military claimed to have killed 1,106 rebels, arrested 1,544, 
had 504 surrendered, and 488 weapons had been seized.158  Although the operation was 
able to suppress and reduced the GAM’s military strength significantly, it was clear that 
Operasi Terpadu was not aimed at treating the root causes of the Aceh problems.  There 
was still a possibility that GAM would come back again in the future.  In other words, if 
the government still relied heavily on using military approaches to manage the Aceh 
conflict, the government would still find it difficult to win the hearts and minds of the 
Acehnese. 
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C. ANALYSIS  
The fight between GAM and the Indonesian security forces was asymmetrical in 
terms of personnel numbers, equipment, strategy and tactics.  Indonesian security forces 
not only outnumbered GAM, but they were also better equipped and trained.  If the 
military had the force advantages, GAM, had the advantages of information, better 
knowledge of the terrain and local support, which allowed it to hit the military fairly 
frequently.  As the conflict tended to be protracted due to its low intensity, the military 
employed ineffective counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies.  The Soeharto administration 
fought GAM by using primarily military options to wipe out the rebels.  Only after the 
fall of Soeharto in 1998, did both GAM and the government attempt to solve their dispute 
through political, diplomatic and legal means.  
I will analyze both GAM’s insurgent strategies and the government’s COIN 
strategies in responding to GAM activities in Aceh by using the Diamond Model.  My 
analysis will be based upon the facts that since the government launched military 
operations in 1977, up until 1998 there were no serious negotiation attempts, and between 
1998 and 2004, no successful agreement had been achieved that would address the 
primary causes of the Aceh conflict.  With the removal of the special region in the 1950s 
and the social and economic imbalance, the feeling of exploitation and oppression 
remained unresolved.  Unfortunately, the government’s past failure to hold negotiations 
with GAM to its advantage meant that the next options must be military operations.  
Although the government enjoyed widespread international support for the unity and 
integrity of the Republic, many criticized the government’s COIN efforts’ lack of an exit 
strategy and the failure to apply non-military approaches in any of its operations.  
1. The Strategy of GAM  
As is shown in Figure 3 (Diamond model), in order to win the struggle, GAM has 
to pay more attention to winning the hearts and minds of the people, attacking the 
government infrastructure and the army or security forces, undermining external support 




Since GAM’s first attempt at subverting the New Order regime, its strategies have been 
comprised of two elements, the guerilla struggle and the strategy of internationalization 
through political means.159  GAM focused its strategy of internationalization on the 
efforts to create an East Timor-like scenario that would compel the international 
community to pressure the GoI to separate Aceh from Indonesia.   To undermine external 
support for GoI (see leg 4), GAM lobbied international human rights groups, depicted 
Indonesia’s security forces as human rights violators, and urged an international fact-
finding mission to be sent to Aceh to investigate the crimes against humanity that have 
taken place and are being committed in Aceh.160  GAM also mobilized public opinion 
against the government by denouncing and provoking military repression as well as 
focusing on the military’s human rights violations.161  GAM also employed a strategy to 
disable the local government infrastructure, and if possible, replace it with GAM’s own 
institutions (see leg 2).  Hundreds of schools have been burned down, and a numbers of 
teachers killed.  Many local politicians and civil servants were also murdered or recruited 
into GAM’s parallel government structure.  As a result, by 2001, as much 80 percent of 
Aceh’s villages were under GAM’s control, and almost all government infrastructure had 
stopped functioning.162 
GAM implemented the tactics of avoiding strength and striking at weakness.  
These tactics required good intelligence as a decisive factor in planning guerilla 
operations to locate the military unit position.  Here, as shown in leg 3, GAM’s tactics 
were mostly hit-and-run ambushes followed by withdrawal into the mountains or 
blending among the population.  As Mao put it, “if we do not have a 100 percent 
guarantee of victory, we should not fight a battle; …when the enemy is well armed and 
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his troops numerous and courageous, we have to evade clashes.”163  Due to GAM’s 
superior information, most clashes between the security forces and GAM were under the 
conditions of its own choosing.  GAM had superior knowledge of the terrain; they were 
able to use it to their advantage and the Indonesia security forces’ confusion.  GAM’s 
guerilla tactics are to fight only when the chances of victory are in their favor; they will 
withdraw if the outcome of the battle is unpredictable.  
The Indonesian military, on the other hand, should have known how to handle 
GAM’s guerilla strategy militarily, as the insurgents were repeatedly crushed by the 
military, and yet their resistance revived again and again.  In asymmetric warfare like 
this, GAM’s strategy was to exploit the vulnerability of the Indonesia security forces (see 
leg 3).  GAM attempted to counterbalance its strength by modifying the strategic usage of 
its very limited fighting force.  Many observers assessed that GAM members generally 
showed little military skill or discipline, and most would be easy prey for military attacks.  
GAM’s fighters, however, had an extensive network of informers and look-outs with 
good communications who were able to provide superior intelligence and an early 
warning system of any military or police movement.  GAM fighters frequently conducted 
ambushes of convoys and raids on military offices and police stations and murdered some 
police and soldiers.  The government, on the other hand, conducted the war based on a 
lack of military intelligence about Aceh’s sociological knowledge.  The military had 
insufficient intelligence and awareness of the Acehnese sociological situation.  Kell 
argues that the military’s strategy concentrated on the use of “shock therapy,” a campaign 
of terror designed to create fear among the population and make them withdraw their 
support for GAM.164  As a result, during the DOM period, the security forces tortured 
and killed thousands of Acehnese, resulting in useless destruction, as the collateral 
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damage was mostly civilians, and generating movement and resentment toward the 
Indonesian government, especially the military.165  
In terms of the diplomatic struggle, as mentioned before, GAM’s agenda was to 
internationalize the conflict (see leg 5).  For example, GAM approached international 
organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, and governments 
sympathetic to GAM, such as Sweden and Norway.  GAM’s goal was to get them 
involved and to recognize GAM as legitimate freedom fighters rather than a mere 
separatist movement.  However, the guerillas gained confidence and professionalism after 
hundreds of GAM fighters received military training in Libya in the mid-1980s.  The 
active members of GAM grew considerably over time.  The first GAM rebellion from 
1976 until 1979 consisted of only 25–200 active guerilla fighters.  The fighting capacity 
increased after Libyan “graduates” trained new members from 1989 until 1991; the active 
members numbered several hundreds and reached its peak at around 15,000–27,000 
fighters in 2004.  Its arsenal also increased dramatically to some 2,234 weapons, 
especially during the 2002–3 Cessation of hostilities Agreement (CoHA).166  Because of 
the shortage of firearms, GAM also mixed its arsenal with self-manufactured guns.  But 
the problem of ammunition remained, GAM was unable make it without precision 
machinery, which had to be imported from other countries such as Thailand or Java.167  
This situation forced GAM to disappear into the jungle for long periods of time, and re-
emerge later when the time permitted. 
The security forces should have anticipated GAM’s provocations.   In 2000, as the 
round of talks in Geneva had put the Aceh issue under the international spotlight, GAM 
tried to undermine external support for GoI by provoking the government to use military 
options in Aceh (see leg 4).  GAM intensified its attacks involving civilian targets, 
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destroying government buildings, piracy and kidnapping for ransom.168 These attacks 
forced the government to reschedule the implementation of special autonomy for Aceh 
province.  GAM apparently knew that the security forces were not in their best state of 
readiness for a protracted asymmetric war.  GAM attempted to internationalize every 
incident involving civilian casualties to offset the government’s legitimacy.  GAM had 
learned that the Santa Cruz incident in 1991 had badly hurt Indonesia’s reputation in 
handling East Timor.  The destruction of Dili in 1999 was the turning point of that 
legitimacy.  GAM was patiently waiting for Indonesia’s security forces to repeat such 
mistakes sooner or later in Aceh.  In the GAM’s calculation, if such incidents were 
repeated again, Indonesia would lose its legitimacy and GAM would win international 
sympathy.  In the case of the Aceh conflict, the COIN strategies, therefore, must be 
focused on winning the hearts and minds of the people. 
2. The Strategy of the Government  
The government should have realized that social discontent was at the heart of 
any insurgency and that winning the people’s hearts and minds was the primary goal of 
the COIN strategy to reduce the local population’s support for the separatists (see leg 1).  
That was a key ingredient for success in combating insurgency in Aceh.  Many criticized 
that the government appeared to have no clear objective in this conflict, no criteria for 
“success” except control of territory and body count, and had no exit strategy.169  The 
government’s COIN strategy typically used all its effort to crush GAM as soon as 
possible, once and for all, and without pursuing any non-military solutions. 
When President Wahid was in power, however, he began pursuing non-military 
approaches.  From GAM’s perception at this time, the international community was its 
savior, and the GoI found itself in trauma over the international role of the independence 
of East Timor.  President Wahid’s effort to involve a foreign facilitator to open dialogue 
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with the exiled GAM leadership to hold negotiations was not supported by the political 
elite or the military leaders.  In 1999, the East Timorese were granted a UN-supervised 
referendum to decide whether they would accept special autonomy within Indonesia or 
choose independence.  East Timor and Aceh were completely different in terms of their 
historical background.  The clear distinction was that the United Nations had never 
recognized Indonesia’s occupation of the territory.  Aceh, on the other hand, had always 
been recognized as part of modern Indonesia as it was stated in the Round Table 
Conference agreement in 1949 as a transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia.  In the case of Aceh (see leg 5), it seemed that the government lacked a 
strategy to convince the international community that the Aceh problem was a separatist 
threat, and not the extended human rights violations, so that the government had a 
legitimate right to defend its territorial integrity, sovereignty by any means necessary, 
either militarily or politically. 
Unfortunately, the military apparently set the success criteria to be the number of 
GAM killed, arrested and surrendered, and tended to exercise a direct strategy (see leg 3).  
Even superpowers such the United States did not win the war in Vietnam when body 
count was introduced to determine the success or failure of the war effort by General 
William Westmoreland.170  As McCormick stated, the COIN strategy put the population  
as a center of gravity (COG) meaning that all the effort was to be concentrated on 
winning the hearts and minds of the people (see leg 1).  Unfortunately, it was not easy to 
determine whether those killed were GAM fighters or ordinary Acehnese.  The civilian 
casualties were hard to avoid, as the guerillas blended in the population.  Without 
uniforms, they were very much like ordinary Acehnese.  The problems on the ground 
made it difficult for the military to draw a clear distinction between guerilla fighters and 
civilians.  Here, as what happened in the field due to the shortage of arms, the GAM  
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fighters comprised some ten to twelve people and it could be that only four to six of them 
were equipped with arms.  As they became involved in combat situations and some of the 
armed rebels were shot down by the military, the survivors of the fighting grabbed their 
fallen comrades’ arms, and let them without arms.  This frequently took place in Aceh, 
making it difficult for the military to defend its position that they had shot the GAM 
combatants and not ordinary Aceh people.   
The strategy that the military employed in Aceh was mainly to locate and 
decapitate the GAM leadership.  The effort to separate the people from GAM became the 
key objective in every COIN operation.  The classic strategy of the military was to comb 
the villages in an attempt to push GAM back into the jungle in the hopes of cutting the 
link between GAM and the population (see leg 2).  The TNI also tried to cut off GAM’s 
logistical supply by preventing it from obtaining weapons that were allegedly smuggled 
through coastal regions as well as from other areas (see leg 4).  As a result, after the six 
month period of the 2003 Operasi Terpadu (Integrated  Operation), the TNI claimed that 
almost 50 percent of GAM’s five thousand personnel had either been killed or captured, 
and 459 of some 2,000 weapons owned by GAM were confiscated.171  The police 
statistics regularly showed that the death toll between GAM and the civilian population 
indicated only slightly more civilians than rebels.  An example of that occurred in June 
2003 when the police revealed that 124 civilians and 109 GAM had been killed.172  The 
discrepancy of statistics, as the International Crisis Group (ICG) argues, was apparently 
due to the fact that the military and the police had their own definitions regarding GAM 
and civilians.  Besides, there was no opportunity for an independent verification to 
identify whether or not those killed were GAM.173.  As a result, since President 
Megawati took power, many believed that the central government leaders were more  
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concerned with the elimination of separatism than with the search for a democratic 
solution to the Aceh conflict.  Her administration relied far more heavily on military 
operations.174 
D. SUMMARY  
The counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh in the mid-1990s created a deep 
resentment toward the Acehnese.  An analysis of the counter-insurgency using the 
Diamond model suggests that the use of excessive force generated levels of oppression 
among the Acehnese.  Instead of defeating GAM militarily, the military stimulated a 
deep-rooted anger and hatred among the population.  The strategies employed by the 
government depended heavily on its military power and were shaped by a specific 
historical context.  At that time, military options were the key to suppress the rebellions 
throughout the archipelago.  But, the “one-size fits all” strategy cannot be adopted for all 
problems in Indonesia.  Aceh has distinct characteristics compared to other areas of the 
archipelago.  The Aceh historical background showed us how the Acehnese dealt with the 
foreign powers from when it was under the sultanate until its incorporation into the 
Republic, and this should have been taken into consideration when trying to resolve 
problems in Aceh. 
The military strategy is comprised of three steps, the separation of GAM from the 
people, isolation, and neutralization.  The separation of GAM from the people, as 
suggested by the Diamond model, was not done correctly by the military as the GAM 
enjoyed much support in the villages and urban areas.  The TNI also faced difficulties 
cutting off GAM’s logistical supply completely, and only limited the flow of GAM 
logistical supply.  The next step, to isolate GAM from the population, began with forcing 
GAM away from villages and then the elimination of GAM fighters.  The classic counter-
insurgency to destroy GAM, as discussed above, generated thousands of GAM personnel 
that had either been captured or killed, and thousands of weapons that had been 
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confiscated.  The conflict, however, did not show any signs of ending.  Many criticized 
the government for failing to understand how to implement an integrated operation.  The 
“Operasi Terpadu” (Integrated Operation) should have included non-military options 
such as humanitarian aid and development assistance, as many suggested.  The primary 
Acehnese grievance was that the government had not yet adequately addressed the 
various unjust policies of the past. 
The fall of the Soeharto regime marked the transition from an authoritarian to 
democratic government, but it did not have much effect on the strategy employed by the 
government.  Despite the fact that the Aceh conflict was a combination of social, 
economic, political and armed insurgency, the government tended to rely heavily on 
military operations to resolve it.  From the period of the DOM (1990–1998), for example, 
the military launched Operasi Jaring Merah (Operation Red Net) to destroy the rebels.  
The military was having a hard time  avoiding human rights violations during this period.  
Instead of defeating GAM militarily, the government failed to maintain popular support; 
in fact, GAM was able to develop a significant popular base, a sustainable flow of arms 
to Aceh, and a well-managed command structure.  GAM was able to increase and expand 
from the small areas into the rest of Aceh, and successfully controlled between 70 and 80 
percent of the province, including local government, through their shadow civil service 
structure.175  As a result, the main causes of the Aceh conflict were not addressed, and in 
fact, the military approaches to solving the Aceh conflict alienated much of the Acehnese 
society, especially during the DOM period.  The security approaches adopted by the 
central government heightened the conflict.  GAM began as a small guerilla band gaining 
popular support because of the brutal measures undertaken by the military in combating 
the rebels.  In fact, people who joined with GAM in its armed struggle were those whose 
family members were killed or tortured by the security forces or had witnessed such 
brutality.  The security forces did not know how to win the hearts and minds of the 
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Acehnese people.  The degree of repressiveness transformed GAM from a guerilla force  
to a popular resistance movement.  It was clear that the government did not treat Aceh’s 
population as the center of gravity in its counter-insurgency operations was suggested in 








IV. POLITICAL APPROACHES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Since the first rebellion in 1976, GAM leader Hasan Tiro employed rhetoric 
indicating that Aceh had a distinct historical and cultural heritage that differed from the 
rest of the archipelago as the central argument of his secessionist movement.  In the eyes 
of Aceh’s separatist movement, a referendum similar to the one held in East Timor was 
the only way to Acehnese independence.  After seeing East Timor’s success, the 
Acehnese demanded the same policy, but the GoI resisted and the conflict escalated.  The 
government realized that granting referendum rights on Aceh might stimulate similar 
demands in other regions, and could even lead to the breakup of the country.  The GoI in 
general, and especially the military (TNI), supported harsh measures against GAM.  
However, the issues that prompted the rebellion from the beginning were never taken 
care of, and a lot of civilian casualties were reported as collateral damage of military 
operations.  The international public demanded peaceful measures to bring to an end the 
conflict, a military withdrawal, and the end of human rights violations.  As a result, the 
Aceh conflict became the focus of international attention.   
As the conflict became an international issue, GAM became increasingly known 
internationally due to its use of the internet.  The overwhelming use of military force led 
to the condemnation of the military approach to solve the Aceh problem.  A series of 
political settlements were negotiated and implemented after the downfall of the Soeharto 
regime, but all failed.  Some believe that the failure was due to the military not wanting 
to talk with separatist rebels.176  From the Indonesian military (TNI) perspective, GAM 
should have accepted Aceh’s status as a province within the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia (NKRI).  GAM leaders, however, realized that they could only expect to win 
independence through negotiations, because GAM military forces numbered only a few 
thousand poorly-armed men.  GAM could only prevent the TNI from winning the war.  
                                                 




Since GAM could not defeat the Indonesian forces, and there was no international 
support for Acehnese independence.  For these reasons, Aceh needed a different solution, 
the constructive conflict resolution.  
B. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
1. Constructive Conflict Resolution  
According to Kriesberg, the escalation of a conflict is not necessarily 
destructive.177  But in the case of the Aceh conflict, the conflict between the Government 
of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM tended to be intractable and destructive claiming tens of 
thousands of lives.  After drawing lessons from the achievements and failings of the 
2000–2003 peace process, the participants of this conflict began considering an 
alternative course of action.  The de-escalation of the Aceh conflict was accelerated by 
the massive natural disaster in which struck the Aceh province at end of 2004, an event 
which also contributed to both sides considering negotiations and allowing the flow of 
international aid coming to the Aceh province.  This chapter will focus on processes and 
conditions fostering the de-escalation of conflict.  The table below shows the conflict 
components and destructiveness that occurred in the Aceh conflict that might lead to the 
escalation or de-escalation of the conflict.  The Aceh conflict moved from destructive to a 
more constructive settlement, especially after the massive disaster that hit Aceh; the 
province was among the areas hardest hit, claiming some two hundred thousand people.  I 
will use Kriesberg’s conflict components such as identity, grievance, goals and methods 
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Identity The base of GAM’s struggle for 
independence: ethno-nationalism (racial 
exclusivity), Acehnese have different 
identity than the rest of the Republic. 
Defining self by opposing other, for 
instance, GAM attempted to drive 
thousands of Javanese migrants out of the 
Aceh province. 
 
The Acehnese had a strong identity with 
Islam, and supported the newly established 
Republic.  
The Acehnese wanted a special region status 
for the Aceh province. 
 
  
Grievance GAM leaders used issues such as Aceh’s 
natural resources exploitation, and 
economic marginalization to create negative 
sentiment toward the central government. 
The government, on the other hand, tended 
to address the Aceh problem through 
military settlement, and led to human rights 
violations 
The GoI implemented policies to address 
the root causes of the Aceh problem. 
Goals Zero-sum conflict, and seek destruction of 
other: GAM wanted full independence for 
Aceh; the GoI insisted that Aceh would be 
in the framework of the unitary state. 
 
  
Assume to be in mixed-sum conflict, or 
win-win solution. Both sides seek 
cooperative solution through negotiations. 
  
Methods GAM leaders believe armed struggle could 
achieve the Aceh independence. The GoI 
wanted to defeat GAM militarily. 
Indiscriminate violence allowed 
GAM and the GoI believe non-coercive 
means possible to settle the dispute 
Use of violence greatly limited 
Table 2.   Conflict Component and Destructiveness178 
If we examine the progress of the Aceh conflict, it can be concluded that the 
conflict has escalated for two reasons over the years.  First, the Acehnese demanded the 
implementation of autonomy and Islamic law, directed by Daud Beureuh of the Darul 
Islam (DI), which then became a demand for total independence, led by Hasan Tiro, the 
GAM leader.  Second, GAM started as a small guerilla band in 1976, and the government 
always chose military options.  Instead of the problem being solved quickly, these 
policies generated the emergence of a nationalist sentiment.  As the conflict had a 
tendency to escalate, the government tended to respond to the ethno-nationalist 
                                                 




movements as direct threats to the concept of the unitary state of Indonesia, and therefore 
thought they should be crushed by military power.  Tiro attempted to construct a racial 
distinction and exclusivity.  After such an ideological identity has been constructed, the 
result was that most Indonesians were unable to understand Acehnese narrow-
mindedness, and most Acehnese were unable to understand Indonesia.  Henders argues 
many Acehnese are trapped within a definition of themselves as a pressured minority, 
which focused on a widespread sense of lost greatness, but also the feeling that today’s 
struggle continues an earlier history.179  As a result, the conflict was likely to be more 
destructive.  For example, the violence led by GAM fighters against Javanese migrants 
generated the massive displacement of almost two hundred thousand people between 
between 1999 and 2000.180 
Sukma also argues that strong reliance on the New Order development strategy 
impacted the environment, economically and socially.  The natural resources exploitation 
created a problem in Aceh.  With its abundant natural resources such as oil, natural gas, 
timber, and precious minerals, Aceh contributed around 11 percent of Indonesia’s 
national revenue, and some U.S. $2.6 billion a year from liquid natural gas (LNG) 
alone.181  Ironically, Aceh was among the poorest provinces in Indonesia.  In this case, 
the government obviously ignored the welfare of the people who owned the natural 
resources.  Not only were natural resources being exploited, human rights were also 
being disregarded.  Robinson criticized that the COIN operations in Aceh were conducted 
at a time when the New Order leaders had reason to believe that the brutal methods used  
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in East Timor, Iran Jaya (Papua) and other “trouble spots” had worked.  Under the same 
conditions, they felt confident that the same methods could be used to generate a similar 
effect in Aceh.   
The extensive use of violence generated levels of insecurity and political violence 
far greater than anything that could have been done by GAM, who had, itself,  created 
long term consequences, and stimulated a deep-seated anger among Acehnese.182  The 
Aceh conflict tended to escalate as indicated by an increase in the number of active GAM 
members from the first, second, and third emergences.  The Acehnese also tended to 
support GAM as shown by the massive demonstration in the capital city of Banda Aceh, 
which demanded a referendum in 1999.  When both parties attempted to solve the 
conflict through non-violence and settlements during the 2000–2003 Geneva talks, the 
results were far from satisfactory.  The talks were able to lower violence only marginally, 
but were not able to halt the conflict permanently.  At this stage, the role of a third party 
became crucial due to the fact that a distrust emerged between the adversaries.  The entry 
of a third party, such as the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) allowed both parties to 
restore peace negotiations.  GAM subsequently wanted to discuss arrangements other 
than independence.  For the government of Indonesia’s perspective, anything is possible 
to reach an agreement as long as GAM abandons its goal of total independence. 
The involvement of a third party in the peace process contributed to the de-
escalation of the conflict.  In addition, the, Acehnese suffered the most in the conflict, 
many of them tired of the conflict and they wanted the conflict to be resolved peacefully.  
The Acehnese, who suffered from both the tsunami and the armed conflict garnered 
empathy and sympathy from the international community.  As Kriesberg put it, 
sympathizing and empathizing are social psychological processes that significantly 
contribute to conflict de-escalation.  Empathy includes precisely perceiving the other 
person’s feelings and thoughts relating to the conflict, as well as experiencing the other 
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people’s feelings and thoughts as if they were their own.183  The tsunami disaster in 
2005, which claimed almost two hundred thousand Acehnese prompted the sympathy of 
the international community and forced the two adversaries to de-escalate the conflict to 
give way to the international aid that flowed into Aceh province.  The GoI and GAM had 
a common goal, seeking a cooperative solution through negotiations, and believed that a 
non-coercive means was the best way to address the Aceh conflict. 
2. Peace Negotiations  
a. Peace Settlement in the First Rebellion  
Many scholars agree that the initial diagnosis of Aceh’s problem put the 
blame on the central government rather than on Acehnese society itself.  As previously 
discussed, the Aceh conflict was based on a sense that Aceh was the hero of the 
revolutionary war, and had been marginalized.  The central government also disregarded 
the Acehnese identity as devout Muslims who proudly referred to their province as 
Serambi Mekah (Verandah of Mecca).  There were open demands in Aceh for the 
creation of an Islamic state, and by 1953, Daud Beureuh established a paramilitary 
organization and contacted Kartosuwiryo, the Darul Islam leader in West Java.  On 
September 21, 1953, Daud Beureuh formally linked Aceh to the Islamic Indonesian State 
(NII, Negara Islam Indonesia) and joined the DI rebellion.  For the DI rebels in Aceh, 
Islam was fundamental and indivisible for Indonesia; therefore, the DI rejected the idea 
of the Pancasila principles of the Indonesian Republic.  Islam covers all aspects of public 
and private life.  From this DI perspective, Islam was not merely faith but also ideology, 
therefore, establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia was an obligation for all Muslims.  
The conflict escalated because Daud Beureuh tended to favor forceful resistance to 
achieve his goal.     
In order to reduce the tension between Aceh and the central government, 
the government employed the non-military method of granting Aceh the status of Special 
                                                 




Province in 1959, with autonomy in terms of religion, hukum adat (customary law) and 
education.  Daud Beureuh agreed to negotiate his goal, from the implementation of 
Islamic law for the Indonesian state, in general, to be Islamic law in Aceh, in 
particular.184  Although peace was reached in Aceh as Daud Beureh’s ideological stance 
softened, Masyumi, DI and other Islamists failed to achieve an Islamic state in Indonesia.  
At that time, Islamic radical movements were considered part of the problem that 
hampered unity in the nation.  By 1960, Islamist movements had been marginalized; the 
Soekarno administration with the so-called Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) 
(1957–1965) employed the Indonesian armed forces effectively to overcome various 
national problems including Islamic-based revolts.  The military leaderships, on the other 
hand, favored a secular idea and gave their support to Soekarno’s Pancasila doctrine.  
This was reasonable since members of the Indonesian armed forces came from different 
backgrounds, and tended to reflect the sub-cultural background of those areas.185  The 
Indonesian army had an important role in curbing the Darul Islam-inspired rebellions by 
employing counter-insurgency campaigns.  Aceh’s first rebellion, however, ended 
peacefully through negotiation instead of military defeat.  The armed rebellion as DI’s 
method to establish an Islamic state as its goal was brought to an end in 1962.  Daud 
Beureuh was not killed in the military campaign or executed, but surrendered and was 
granted amnesty.186   
b. Peace Settlement under President Habibie 
The collapse of the Soeharto administration in May 1998 marked the 
emergence of the popular movement to eradicate corruption, collusion and nepotism 
(KKN), promote democratization and renew civil-military relations.  At the same time, 
the provinces demanded greater autonomy and a larger share of the natural resources 
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revenue.  B.J Habibie, Soeharto’s Vice President assumed the presidency in August 1998.  
He then launched a phenomenal decision for the status of East Timor.  As Jemadu put it,  
Habibie’s decision as part of his own political calculations, in the hopes of distancing 
himself from the authoritarian image of the Soeharto regime, promoted some democratic 
styles in his policies such as freedom of the press, the establishment of independent 
political parties, the imposition of new regional autonomy laws, the release of political 
prisoners, and the promise of a fair and democratic general election in 1999 to address the 
Acehnese grievances.187  In term of the secessionist movements, he offered two choices 
to the East Timorese, either integration or separation from the Indonesian state a 
referendum.  His decision intensified the ethno-nationalist struggles against the 
Indonesian state, including Aceh’s secessionist movement.  East Timor had a clearly 
distinctive history of forced incorporation into the Indonesian nation.  Aceh, however, 
has always been an integral part of the Republic as the Acehnese indicated when they 
joined their fellow nationalist youth organizations to drive the Dutch out of the 
archipelago.  President Habibie attempted to resolve Aceh’s conflict through different 
methods such as sending human rights investigators, and releasing hundreds of Acehnese 
political prisoners, as well as reducing the military presence in the province by 
withdrawing non-organic security forces.  The military leaders also wanted to pacify the 
Acehnese as was demonstrated by the Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) 
General Wiranto in August 1998.  He went to Aceh to apologize for what the TNI had 
done in Aceh in the past, especially during the period of the enactment of Daerah Operasi 
Militer (DOM, Military Operation Zone). 
In addition to de-escalating the center-periphery tensions, his 
administration also used non-coercive means, and the use of violence was greatly limited.  
He launched a decentralization policy by introducing various autonomy laws.  The most 
important of the laws, which was only applied to Aceh, was Law No. 44 of 1999 that was 
also known as “Special Status of the Province of Aceh Special Region.” This law was 
                                                 
187 Aleksius Jemadu, “Democratisation, the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Resolving of the Aceh 





undoubtedly similar to the previous one, which was granted in 1959 as a part of the Darul 
Islam settlement, allowing Aceh autonomy in terms of its religious, cultural and 
educational affairs.  As Gibbon and Miller pointed out, the implementation of this law 
was based on the assumption that the 1959 law failed to satisfy the Acehnese.188  The 
government believed that Law No. 44 of 1999 was the key to reducing the discontent 
between Aceh and Jakarta and affected popular support for GAM.  The implementation 
of Islamic law alone, however, failed to deal with the primary issue.  Acehnese were, 
indeed, happy to welcome Islamic law as they demanded for so long, but they needed 
more than that; human rights and profit-sharing as well as independence were more 
crucial issues among Acehnese society.  Many criticized the government decision to 
implement Islamic law as a poor strategy as GAM leaders, ulama and student groups no 
longer pursued the Islamic state as they had in 1950s and 1960s.  GAM used Islam 
merely as a symbol and to gain popular support to create basic ethno-nationalist feelings 
which helped  it  deliver its message of referendum and independence.  Although Habibie 
tried to implement various democratic methods, he failed to convince the Acehnese to 
remain part of the Indonesian state.  GAM, on the other hand, demanded a referendum 
and was inspired by Habibie’s approval of a referendum for East Timor.  
c. Peace Settlement under President Abdurrahman Wahid  
Habibie’s successor, Abdurahman Wahid, was the first elected President 
of Indonesia after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998.  Many expected that the Wahid 
administration would settle the separatism issue in Aceh, Papua and East Timor with a 
more constructive resolution as before being elected president, Wahid was a prominent 
democratic figure.  He was also known to be a longstanding opponent of the Soeharto 
regime.  Like Habibie’s move, Wahid made a statement supporting a referendum for 
Aceh.  His decision, however, had little support from the military due to the bitter lessons 
of internationalization from the East Timor conflict leading to its separation from 
Indonesia.  The People’s Representative Council (DPR) also expressed disagreement by 
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removing all references to a referendum for resolving the Aceh conflict.  For these 
reasons, Wahid then turned his decision to initiate dialogue with GAM.  His conciliatory 
approach in 2000, which was brokered by the newly-established Henry Dunant Center 
(HDC), lasted a relatively short period of time.  
The GAM representatives in the negotiations insisted on their goal of total 
independence, but the Indonesian representatives believed that the peace talks could only 
be achieved within the framework of a unitary state.  The HDC expected that the 
dialogues focus on the humanitarian issues since the conflict claimed a large number of 
human casualties.  The HDC initiative was supported by the international community in 
general, and by the United States as well as the European Union in particular.  In the 
talks, both sides acknowledged that the government could not crush GAM militarily, and 
that GAM had no prospects for defeating the military.189  From GAM’s perspective, 
regardless of the outcome, it had managed to internationalize the issue in the hopes that 
the United States and the European Union would put pressure on Indonesia to grant 
independence to Aceh.  GAM leaders  had long sought this opportunity to internationally 
disclose the human right abuses that were taking place in Aceh.  For the government, this 
was also the opportunity to show, internationally, that it was serious about handling 
human rights issues and internal conflicts at a time when its reputation was badly 
damaged by the East Timor case. 
In May 2000, the government and GAM representatives signed a “Joint 
Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh,” to promote “confidence-building” 
measure toward a peaceful solution to the conflict situation in Aceh.  The Humanitarian 
pause was a ceasefire, a three-month accord designed to halt the fighting and to allow the 
distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Acehnese.  The government representative 
was Hasan Wirajuda, who was an Indonesian ambassador to the UN, and Hasan Tiro for 
the GAM.  Many Indonesians, especially the military, expressed disagreement with the 
negotiation because they believed that GAM should not be treated as equal to the TNI-
Polri (Indonesian National Police).  The reason was that it could create a precedent that 
                                                 




might implicitly recognize GAM as an “international actor,” and would invite 
“international forces to intervene.”190  The widespread criticisms of the Humanitarian 
Pause were not baseless as there were many reports on the ground that GAM used the 
pause to expand recruitment and training as well as collect taxes in the areas under its 
control.191  The reality was that GAM used this opportunity to regroup and rearm.192  
This was a clear indication that GAM wanted to escalate the conflict deliberately, and 
resulted in a series of clashes between Indonesian security forces and GAM combatants 
that took place soon after the Humanitarian Pause began.  
The situation deteriorated as assassination became common, and this 
agreement failed to de-escalate the violence in Aceh.  In response, Wahid issued 
Presidential Instruction No. 4/2001, the so-called Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan 
Penegakan Hukum (Operation for the Restoration of Security and Enforcement of the 
Law), and passed the law for “Special Autonomy” for Aceh in July 2001.  The Special 
Autonomy law gained little support in Aceh because it did not provide for immediate 
provincial and gubernatorial elections, and did not clarify how Sharia law would be 
implemented in the province.  Moreover, the law did not allow for the establishment of 
local political parties.193  Wahid, therefore, failed to achieve a peaceful conflict 
resolution, and in fact the violence escalated.  On July 23, 2001, President Abdurrahman 
Wahid had to step down due to his impeachment by the National Assembly (MPR), and 
allowed his vice president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, to succeed him.  
d. Peace Settlement under President Megawati Sukarnoputri  
Megawati took a different step to address Aceh conflict; she signed Law 
No. 18/2001 on Aceh’s special autonomy in the hope that GAM would accept that, and 
abandon its demand for independence.  Megawati also continued efforts to settle the 
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conflict through negotiation, and on December 9, 2002, the Indonesian representatives 
and GAM finally managed to sign the Cessation of Hostilities agreement (COHA).  The 
main intention of the COHA was to bring about another ceasefire and at the same time to 
evaluate the law on Special Autonomy.  But the agreement failed to put an end to the 
conflict; GAM refused to abandon their primary goal for full independence as indicated 
and resisted being disarmed.  As a subsequent response to the failure of the peaceful 
settlement, the government enacted Presidential Decree No. 28/2003 on the Declaration 
of a State Emergency with the Status of Martial Law in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
Province on 19 May 2003.  The military operations in this period were accompanied by 
increasing allegations of human rights abuses.  This was due to the fact that the 
operations still focused on the elimination of GAM.  Again, the Megawati administration 
also failed to address the Acehnese grievances and bring lasting peace to Aceh. 
e. Peace Settlement under President S.B Yudhoyono 
The 2004 general election brought Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also 
known as SBY) to power as the fifth Indonesian president.  As the Coordinating Minister 
for Political and Security affairs in President Megawati’s cabinet, he had worked to find 
ways to settle the conflict peacefully.  On December 26, 2004, however, the tsunami that 
hit Aceh killed hundreds of thousands of people.  Many believed that the massive disaster 
led the government of Indonesia and GAM back to the negotiating table to seek peace 
through non-violent methods.  In addition to the tsunami, President SBY and Vice-
President Jusuf Kalla, since their election in September 2004, had demonstrated a strong 
commitment to settle the Aceh conflict through a negotiated solution and with 
international support.  GAM, on the other side, had shown its sincerity to conclude the 
armed struggle throughout the process.  On August 15, 2005, in Helsinki, Finland, the 
government of Indonesia and GAM representative took a constructive initiative to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and brought an end to nearly three decades of 




The peace agreement, brokered by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) 
led by Finland’s former president, Marti Attisari, and was monitored by the member 
states of the European Union (EU) as well as five Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries.  With strong support from the EU and five participating ASEAN 
countries, peace now returned to Aceh, and the Acehnese could exercise authority over 
its own affairs within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.  The agreement 
included a series of requirements of both parties to maintain peace.  In exchange, the 
Indonesian government promised broad autonomy, the right to form local political 
parties, and local control over the revenues from Aceh’s natural resources.  GAM had to 
give up its armed struggle and hand over all its weapons.  GAM committed itself publicly 
to becoming a local political party within six months of the enactment and dismantling as 
a rebel movement shortly thereafter.  In July 2007, Partai GAM (GAM Party) was 
established by former GAM combatants, with the GAM flag as the party symbol.  And 
yet, in spite of being protested as a violation of the Helsinki agreement, Partai GAM 
officially changed its name.  In April 2008, Partai GAM became Partai Aceh (Aceh 
Party), and along with the other local parties, the Acehnese were now able to channel 
their political aspirations. 
3. Aceh Post-Conflict Situation 
It is important to know the current situation in Aceh four years after the peace 
agreement was signed.  I interviewed key figures in Aceh, such as the governor of Aceh 
himself, the regional military commander, who is a two-star general, as well as high and 
middle ranking military and police officers.  These included former GAM members, 
members of NGOs, human rights and civil society groups in Aceh and Jakarta.  In 
addition, I interviewed some scholars who were involved in Aceh’s post-conflict 
reconstruction and rehabilitation.  I also conducted interviews in Singapore, Banda Aceh 
and Jakarta, and communicated with some sources by telephone, text messaging and 






sponsored by a Singapore-based organization, the Asian Research Institute (ARI), from 
February 22–23, 2009.  Some of interviewees are not identified by name or recorded for 
personal reasons. 
Evidence of the successful political settlement to the prolonged and bloody 
conflict was when the former GAM leader Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar of 
SIRA (Aceh People Independence Voice) were officially sworn in as the new governor 
and vice-governor of Aceh Province on 8 February 2007, pledging allegiance to the 
Republic of Indonesia.  This was one example of the peaceful settlement of almost three 
decades of internal conflict in Indonesia that has worked well so far.  However, due to the 
nature of the conflict in Aceh, factors that could hamper the peace processes remained.  
The signing of the Helsinki peace accord in 2005 has not freed the province from 
violence involving former rebels, as reports of attacks continue to escalate ahead of the 
general election that will be held on April 9, 2009.  The sporadic incidents, low-level 
violence such as murders, shootings, and numerous grenade attacks, as well as criminal 
activities before and after the general election have to be addressed if peace is to be 
preserved in the long run.  A recent report revealed that at least sixteen people were 
killed, and forty-seven people seriously injured in a series of attacks by unidentified 
gunmen between December 2008 and February 2009.194 
Unfortunately, the situation could get worse, as the governor of Aceh depicted the 
relationship between the military and the local government is not too good.195  This is 
due to the fact that many in the TNI are convinced that GAM still demands independence 
and has never changed its goals.  GAM only changes its tactics; it used armed rebels to 
achieve its goals in the past, now it uses democratic means.  Some believe that the GAM 
members that dissolved into the Aceh Party (PA) led by a former rebel, Muzakkir Manaf, 
continued to constitute a potential threat to the unity of the Republic.  This is despite 
repeated public denials by the top leadership of PA, that have been posted in the local 
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media, insisting that PA has a commitment to uphold the unity of Indonesian territory.  
The governor of Aceh himself acted on the side of the PA asking the Acehnese to vote 
PA in the coming election.  He said that the PA is not a separatist party; it is legally 
established based upon the Indonesian Constitution.196  But the evidence on the ground 
showed the opposite, some PA campaigners reportedly circulated leaflets stating that the 
PA was the only legitimate local party according to the MoU, and made its promises to a 
referendum on independence after being victorious in the April 2009 elections.197 
According to Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group (ICG), the military’s 
fears are misplaced, despite the campaign rhetoric of some PA members.  Jones expresses 
disbelief that the PA will use democratic means to achieve independence without hurting 
the Helsinki peace agreement.198  But her suspicion is based on GAM’s failure to 
dissolve itself, and its repeated use of the word “Merdeka” (independence) in its name, 
the rhetoric of many its members in the field, and its leaders still using GAM letterhead 
for correspondence.199  The military sees this as evidence of GAM bad faith. The 
regional military commander, Major General Soenarko, said that GAM should abandon 
its goal to gain independence and to stop acting in bad faith, and then he believes that 
Aceh will be at peace.200  The dissolution, however, is not explicitly specified in the 
MoU, but repeatedly demanded by the Indonesian side to the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
(AMM). The GAM leaders agreed to dismantle the organization “as soon as possible” 
meaning that GAM will have six months to transform itself into a political party.201  
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GAM leaders have no valid reason to postpone dissolving the organization after 
transforming GAM into a popular political party since its establishment on July 7, 2007 
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Indonesia.  GAM, therefore, requires 
dissolution, and changing its name and its mission; it would, of course, remain a 
stakeholder in the implementation process as signatory of the Helsinki peace agreement.  
In line with the MoU’s recognition of Aceh’s incorporation into Indonesia, GAM is 
required to show its good will, and abandon its goal by publicly dissolving the 
organization.   
A direct consequence of the mutual distrust, affecting the performance of the 
soldiers on the ground, between TNI and GAM tended to escalate over time.  One  
example of this was a widely circulated text message on March 3, 2009 that claimed that 
a sub-district military commander, Lieutenant Erwin, and the ten men under his 
command pulled up and stomped some 400 PA flags in the sub-district of Simpang 
Keuramat, North Aceh, a GAM stronghold.202  Erwin and six of his men were tried in an 
emergency court-martial in Aceh’s second largest city, Lhokseumawe.  He was accused 
of having given an order relating to removal of the flags.  Although Lieutenant Erwin was 
finally court-martialed and sentenced to jail for fourteen days, similar cases may take 
place in the future.203  The solution to this situation is better law enforcement, patience, 
employment, and targeted civil society efforts, meaning that the central government 
should place police at the forefront of handling Aceh’s current situation, the impression 
on the ground was that the TNI is again dominating security operations.204  On the other 
hand, the other possible spoilers could come from ex-GAM combatants since some of 
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them still keep their weapons, the exact number of which remains unknown.205  The 
governor of Aceh admitted that uncontrolled ex-combatants could be involved in criminal 
activities such as extortion and armed robberies.  For example, a Singaporean ship was 
boarded on February 19, 2009 by a group of armed ex-combatants, and the captain was 
finally released after paying a ransom of Rp. 1 billion ($100,000).206 
C. ANALYSIS  
Since the GAM’s declaration of independence in 1976 and before 1999, the 
international public did not pay attention to the conflict between the government of 
Indonesia and GAM.  Most states do not support Aceh’s bid for independence, as it 
would affect the stability of Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general.  Therefore, GAM 
could not rely heavily upon armed struggle; its guerilla strategy was accompanied by a 
political strategy centered on the idea of internationalization and negotiations.  After 
1998, GAM concentrated its efforts on appealing to the world about the Aceh conflict 
through the internet in particular.  The government, on the other hand, was concerned 
about the developing situation in Aceh that might lead to the internationalization of the 
conflict similar to the bitter experience of the separation of East Timor after the fall of 
Soeharto in 1998.  Based on past experience where military options were not the best 
choice, the subsequent government combined its strategies and included the non-military 
approaches attempted by the post-Soeharto era to solve the problem.  During the 
Megawati era, her close relationship with the military strengthened her policy on Aceh to 
be stronger and tougher.  The next government exercised the more constructive conflict 
resolution, non-violence options to reduce civilian casualties. 
However, after the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement put an end to the conflict, the 
situation was not automatically calm in Aceh.  Low intensity violence perpetrated by 
unidentified people remained a central issue especially in the days before the general 
election on April 9, 2009.  The military was worried that the Aceh Party (PA), the party 
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formed by former GAM combatants, would win control of local legislatures and then 
challenge the central government’s authority.  The PA is, on the contrary, worried about 
interference from the government.  How will the government and GAM maintain their 
commitment to preserve peace in Aceh?  
I will also analyze the political strategies employed by both sides before and after 
the 2005 peace agreement, and especially in the 2009 general election.  The election will 
be very important for the future of Aceh because the military remains convinced that 
GAM, the local government, and local political parties will be potential threats to 
Indonesia’s territorial integrity.  The military believed that GAM members have not 
abandoned their commitment to independence and will use local elections to pursue that 
goal, the goal of total independence.  Indeed, GAM has no chance to gain full 
independence by either military or political means, or a combination of the two without 
hurting the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement.   
1. The Strategy of GAM  
The GAM’s efforts to internationalize its struggle did not exist until 1999.  From 
exile, Hasan Tiro attempted to lobby for support in the United States and the European 
Union, but without adequate impact.  He then tried to attract attention from the Islamic 
world, and only Libya in 1985 gave its assistance through military training.  Although 
GAM wanted to “internationalize” the Acehnese problem, this time GAM failed to gain 
international pressure on the GoI, that it subsequently pursued after the collapse of the 
Soeharto regime in 1998.  Tiro’s subsequent efforts to lobby the United Nations had a 
smaller impact than he expected.  Although some human rights organizations were 
concerned with the Aceh situation, Tiro failed to gain wider international support.  The 
GAM strategy of internationalization changed dramatically following the fall of Soeharto 
in May 1998.  Soeharto’s successor, President Habibie, made the phenomenal decision to 
approach the East Timor conflict by offering either integration or total separation to the 
East Timorese.  GAM leaders were inspired by the government’s policy toward East 




have concentrated their efforts for referendum; by doing this, they require international 
peace negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations.  In order to gain widespread 
public attention, both nationally and internationally, GAM deliberately made the situation 
more destructive by increasing its armed activities and attacking security forces during 
that period. 
The bitter consequences of the East Timor conflict, due to the gross human rights 
violations committed by the military, drew international public condemnation of the 
government of Indonesia.  Learning from this situation, GAM began depicting the 
Indonesian security forces as human rights violators.  The atrocities of the military and 
police were posted on the Internet in the hopes of gaining the same impact as in East 
Timor in 1991, when the military committed human rights abuses by shooting some 200 
civilians, and led to the independence of East Timor in 2002 following a referendum in 
1999.  
Based on past experiences in which the international public condemned the 
government of Indonesia’s way of handling an internal armed conflict, the government 
attempted to pursue a more constructive conflict resolution through peace negotiations.  
As previously discussed, two peace attempts failed to bring lasting peace to Aceh.  Both 
parties had been known to violate promises before, but the 2005 Helsinki agreement has a 
brighter future than the previous ones.  What makes the Helsinki agreement different? 
Many believe that the strategy of GAM after the peace agreement was signed on August 
15, 2005 was to achieve its hidden agenda: independence and total separation from the 
republic.  The peace agreement was only the first stage of a two-stage process.  The next 
is the local elections of the executive and legislative councils, which are both institutions 
projected to gain the vast majority of votes in these election in order to proceed to its 
agenda.  Even if GAM is able to gain the majority in the local elections, it cannot 
advance its agenda for independence without violating the 2005 Helsinki peace 
agreement.  The independence of Aceh was not planned in the Helsinki agreement.  




goal by using democratic means for total independence.207  GAM tried to bend the term 
“self-government” as “self-determination” as is stated in the UN charter.  The term “self-
government” is actually similar to “autonomy,” or “hak mengatur rumah tangga” (the 
Indonesian translation of the Dutch term “zelfbestuur”) and is currently implemented in 
Aceh based upon the 2005 agreement. 
If the agreement is violated by either side, the international community would not 
give its support.  On GAM’s side, it is impossible to disregard international public 
opinion, and the violation of MoU would harm its reputation.  If GAM still pursues the 
goal of total independence, both by using democratic means and through armed struggle, 
it will still be difficult to achieve due to the fact that there was no adequate international 
support for this idea.  The government of Indonesia, on the other hand, can use all means 
necessary to defend its territory from separation, both military as well as political, but 
now with wider international support.  This is the government’s greatest strength, as 
according to international law, it has legal right to maintain its sovereignty and to defend 
the unity and integrity of Indonesian territory.  Hence both military and democratic 
means for GAM will still have difficulty achieving its goal.  The GAM leaders, therefore, 
have to realize that the goal of a win-win solution is to manage the dispute and that the 
2005 peace agreement is a constructive resolution to bring peace to Aceh. 
2. The Strategy of the Government  
After the Soeharto regime was toppled, President Habibie began withdrawing 
non-organic military forces from Aceh and declared the end of the ‘Region of Military 
Operation’ (DOM) era in 1998.  The commander-in-chief, General Wiranto, followed 
Habibie’s decision by sending a public apology for the trauma affected by military 
operations in the past.  From the strategies employed to address the Aceh conflict, we can 
see significant differences between the Soeharto era and the era of democratic reform.  
The government realized that the conflict could not be solved by using military options 
alone; Aceh needed a more constructive resolution.  For example, in 2001, the non-
                                                 




military option of special autonomy was implemented in the province by President 
Wahid’s administration.  Subsequent governments under Megawati and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) also attempted negotiations with GAM and shifted the approaches 
from military and legal approaches within Aceh to diplomatic and legal efforts to deal 
with GAM leaders in exile.208 
President Wahid invited the Henry Dunant Center (HDC) to come to Aceh shortly 
after he became president.  The December 9, 2002, Cessation of Hostility Agreement 
(COHA) brokered by HDC was not really a peace agreement.  It was designed to halt the 
violence and bring a peaceful end to the conflict in Aceh.  The Wahid administration’s 
strategy to reduce violence in Aceh was through dialogue in the hope that GAM would 
give up the armed struggle and accept special autonomy, but it was opposed by the 
military and many members of the political elite.  The reason for the disagreement was 
that the bilateral negotiations would impact the recognition of GAM as a separatist 
organization with a status equal to that of the government of Indonesia and could lead to 
the separation of Aceh after putting Aceh under the international spotlight.  Despite the 
fact that the implementation of the special autonomy for Aceh did not impact the people’s 
lives significantly, the Acehnese’s grievances remained unaddressed.  There was no clear 
distinction between special autonomy and life under centralization.  These issues were 
crucial stumbling blocks to resolving the conflict through non-military approaches.  As a 
consequence, the government tended to pursue military options whenever the 
negotiations did not have the expected result.  
Many criticized that military options brought tactical gains for the military but 
generated misery for the Acehnese and in fact tended to broaden political support for 
GAM.  Another criticism was that the Indonesia security forces had a narrow parochial 
sense toward handling the separatist movement; they had to do no more than defend the 
territory.   GAM, on the other hand, did not have the capacity to take Aceh by force.  For 
that reason, the security forces should enhance the COIN capacity by using a better 
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strategy of COIN, better skill and disciplined soldiers, the know-how to win the people’s 
hearts and minds, and much improved intelligence capabilities with the full support of the 
government.  The bitter lessons from the past due to the soldiers lack of discipline, which 
was characterized by the widespread series of human rights violations, including torture, 
kidnapping, extrajudicial killings, disappearances and the like, had to be taken into 
consideration.  Instead of defeating the insurgent groups, the security forces failed to win 
the heart and minds of the Acehnese.  The non-military options should have been 
implemented at this stage, and the security forces had to bear in mind that the center of 
gravity of this conflict was laid on the population, not on the territory.  
D. SUMMARY  
The essential component of the Aceh conflict as described on  Table 2 (Conflict 
component and destructiveness), such as ethno-nationalist identity, unaddressed 
grievances due to the exploitation of the natural resources,  and human rights violations 
as well as economic marginalization became the primary causes of the conflict escalation 
in Aceh.  But when the Acehnese goal shifted from total independence to seeking 
cooperation through negotiation, the conflict was gradually reduced.  The conflict also 
tended to be more constructive after the government and GAM leaders agreed to limit the 
use of violence, and believed that non-coercive means were the best way to achieve peace 
in Aceh. 
Kriesberg argues that ethnic or other identities can serve as a basis for 
mobilization and organization to mobilize the Acehnese to armed resistance in the form 
of the Islamic organization of Darul Islam (DI).  The devoutly Islamic character of the 
Acehnese is a key element in nationalist representation of Acehnese identity.  Acehnese 
also believed that Aceh is identical with Islam on which they frequently pride 
themselves.209  In addition to their Islamic identity, the Acehnese have formed a different 
starting point than many other Indonesians.  Their past glory as a major regional military 
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power, an Islamic educational center, and their resistance to the Dutch, generated a 
unique sense of community.  The DI leaders believed that the Islamic identity of the 
Acehnese could help generate resources that might be used to drive the Aceh people to 
achieve their collective goal to establish an Islamic state.  Therefore, when the central 
government did not adopt Islam as a base of the state ideology, the Acehnese felt 
betrayed and that their strong commitment to the revolution was not properly rewarded, 
and that led to the armed rebellion.  When DI was finally crushed by the government in 
1962, GAM emerged and brought their own goal.  GAM clearly represented Aceh’s 
claim to independence, not just in historical terms as DI claimed, but also in terms of 
racial exclusivity, and at least in regard to the Javanese.210  The result was not surprising.  
GAM attempted to drive out those Javanese migrants who were considered to be the main 
beneficiaries of the development of the Aceh province. 
Great inequality in profit-sharing of the natural resources revenue tends to 
become a grievance.  Kriesberg believes that social conflict emerges from having a 
grievance, and by the groups who consider themselves to be suffering injustices.  A sense 
of grievance can arise from economic marginalization, and factors like this generate the 
strength of the grievances.  For example, the Acehnese agreed to what was desirable, but 
they had less than they should had, while the Javanese migrants had more.  In this regard, 
economic marginalization has played a main role in creating Acehnese resistance against 
non-Acehnese and the central government.  The degree of destructiveness, for example, 
increased when the Javanese became a key target of GAM’s physical attacks.  
To reduce the Acehnese grievances, GAM formulated a goal directed at reducing 
them.  GAM leaders reiterated their demand for separation and vowed to use all means 
necessary to realize their goal of total independence.  Both GoI and GAM tended to use 
military force, and as a result, the destructive strategies employed by both sides claimed 
more than ten thousand lives and violated the human rights of the population.  Aceh 
demanded self-determination while Indonesia insisted on the integrity of the unitary of 
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the Republic.  After the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the strategy of a purely military 
action shifted to one more constructive and democratic in nature.  The Habibie 
administration, through passing laws on decentralization, gave Aceh and other provinces 
greater control over natural resources.  President Wahid initiated the negotiation process 
with GAM, and brokered by the Swiss Henri Dunant Center (HDC), and yet failed.  The 
hard line elements within the TNI kept pressing to employ a full-scale military solution to 
the deteriorated situation in Aceh.  Before his impeachment, President Wahid attempted 
to appease his political opponent and gain support from the military.  He signed 
Presidential Decree No. 4, 2001 on Aceh, including special autonomy and political 
dialogue.  The decree, however, failed to stop the violence in Aceh.  After the fall of 
Wahid, who was replaced by Megawati Soekarnoputri, her administration continued to 
pursue a political approach.  As a result, a Cessation of Hostilities was signed in 
December 2002.  The Megawati administration also implemented special autonomy to 
Aceh to calm this province, but unfortunately, when the conflict escalated, the military 
operations remained the answer.  In fact, in terms of numbers, President Megawati sent in 
the largest military operation since the East Timorese invasion of 1975.211  
The methods to solve the problem in Aceh changed considerably after the tsunami 
hit Aceh, and led the degradation of the conflict.  There were at least two major factors 
that contributed to the conflict de-escalation in Aceh besides the shift of strategies.  The 
first was that the Acehnese had suffered the most as a direct result of the conflict, 
especially in the period from mid-2003 and following the tsunami at the end of 2004, 
which marked de-escalation in the conflict.  GAM suffered great damage from both the 
military and the tsunami, and it lost a considerable amount of its infrastructure.  The 
government of Indonesia and GAM both realized that it was necessary to halt the conflict 
due to the fact that it was impossible for Aceh to be in a conflict while Acehnese 
province needed massive rebuilding after the tsunami.  The second main factor was the 
newly elected president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla as his vice-
president who both had a strong commitment to resolving the conflict as part of their 
                                                 




policies to continue pursuing a peace settlement for the Aceh separatist conflict.  The 
government finally addressed the Acehnese problems by considering the Acehnese a 
strong Islamic identity, as well as their political and economic grievances to discover the 
goals and methods needed to raise the prospect of a constructive resolution and eventual 









A. LESSONS LEARNED AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR THE ACEH 
CONFLICT 
After three decades of conflict, the government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM 
leaders finally signed a peace agreement in 2005.  The agreement marked the end of a 
prolonged and bitter war.  In the history of Aceh, from the sultanate until its integration 
into the Republic of Indonesia, the Acehnese demonstrated their never-give-up attitude.  
Until the end of the Dutch rule during World War II, the Acehnese were never fully 
pacified.  After the Japanese surrender in 1945, many Acehnese joined the anti-colonial 
forces fighting the Dutch attempts to regain control in the newly established Republic.  
Although the Acehnese initially rejected incorporation into a united Indonesia, they 
finally accepted the status of an autonomous state within a federal Indonesia in 1949.  
The Acehnese, however, rebelled in the early 1950s, following the central government’s 
decision to reject Islam as a state ideology.  Since then, Aceh has never been pacified by 
the central government.  Although the New Order government did a very effective job of 
controlling most of Aceh for most of time it was in power, this does not mean that the 
root causes of the Acehnese grievances were properly addressed.  In fact, during the 
Soeharto administration, the civilian casualties mounted.  Despite this, the New Order’s 
nation-building project was generally successful, as Miller argues; the growth of 
separatism in East Timor, Papua and Aceh became broader phenomena and led to the loss 
of central state power, authority and legitimacy that accompanied regime change in 1998, 
marking it with the fall of the New Order regime.212  
The various policies had been taken either military or politically.  As previously 
discussed using McCormick’s Diamond model and Kriesberg’s constructive resolution, 
we can see from the past that the Acehnese were unable to be conquered by relying 
heavily on military might.  The harsher the government treatment of the Acehnese, the 
                                                 




more resistance it would face, and as a result, the conflict became intractable and more 
difficult to resolve.  Some believe that military operations under the 2003 martial law 
succeeded in reducing GAM’s military strength, and thus forced GAM to the negotiation 
table.  One of the common perceptions was that the military operations (the 2003–4 
Operasi Terpadu) made GAM leaders more willing to negotiate after the tsunami.  But, 
past experience suggests that military operations against GAM only forced the rebels to 
temporarily retreat, and GAM had an ability to make another comeback with greater 
popular support.  The 1999 massive demonstration in Banda Aceh showed us that the 
Acehnese supported GAM’s idea for total independence through a referendum, or in 
other words, if the military once again defeated GAM militarily, there would be no 
guarantee that GAM would not reemerge later in time.  In fact, the GAM leader, Hasan 
Tiro, is living in exile, making it difficult to defeat GAM militarily.  GAM’s willingness 
to negotiate, however, as Schulze argues, was the combination of both political and 
military approaches.213  The 2003 martial law, with full international support, severely 
blew GAM’s confidence of its strategy of internationalization to support its separatist 
cause.  The massive disaster of the tsunami also forced GAM to declare a unilateral 
ceasefire to allow international humanitarian aids to enter the province.  The Indonesian 
government, on the other side, under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Vice-President Yusuf Kalla, who had a strong commitment to resolving 
the Aceh problem peacefully, saw the window of opportunity.  Indeed, the tsunami alone 
did not end the deep mutual hostilities between the belligerents, but it had an indirect 
impact allowing both sides to reassess their own positions, and in fact, the involvement of 
the international mediating bodies, and especially Marti Attisari, and made the peace 
settlement possible.    
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The McCormick model suggests the Acehnese as the center of gravity, meaning 
that to win the war, the government, and especially the military, has to win the hearts and 
minds of the people.  The military apparently ignored the fact that the excessive use of 
force could switch the preferences of the population.  To many Acehnese, the Indonesian 
army was considered the enemy since the military operations during the DOM (Military 
Operation Zone) period from the 1980s to 1998 generated a large number of civilian 
casualties.  Although in 1998, the Habibie administration and the military leaders 
apologized for the excess and promised to withdraw all combat troops from the province, 
the wounds remained open.   The government repeated the same mistakes; the Wahid and 
Megawati administrations authorized military offensives in the province following the 
failure of the negotiations.  It was clear that military operations were not the solution for 
the Aceh conflict since the military was unable to win the people’s hearts and minds.  
The root causes of the conflict were not military matters, but economic, social, and 
political as well as various injustice policies.  In this case, I agree that the Aceh problem 
was not a military problem.  But, I am not saying that military operations are not 
important, but, that the Aceh conflict cannot be overcome solely by the use of military 
force. 
Kriesberg also suggests that the conflict can be solved through constructive 
resolution.  The win-win situation basis, as adopted in the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of 
Understanding, was an example that a prolonged and intractable conflict such as the Aceh 
conflict could be a good template for any government in the world as to how an internal 
conflict should be concluded.   Once the peace agreement has been achieved, our next job 
is to maintain and preserve it.  This is not an easy task, and in the case of the Aceh 
conflict, there are still possible for spoilers to undermine the peace agreement.  Because 
of the failure of the earlier peace talks, many critics responded skeptically that the 2005 
Helsinki peace agreement could put an end to the Aceh conflict.  Nonetheless, the talks 
succeeded, and it is now four years since its terms have been implemented.   
As mentioned earlier, a series of peace talks brokered by a Swiss-based NGO 




violations.  The main causes of the failure of these talks, as many scholars identified, 
were two issues.  The government insisted that Aceh remain a province of Indonesia.  
GAM leaders, on the other hand, considered that special autonomy only as a starting 
point and therefore they still pursued Aceh’s independence. As noted in the previous 
chapters, GAM was using the ceasefire to strengthen its position by recruiting and  
fundraising.214  As a result, in 2003, President Megawati announced a military 
emergency status for the Aceh province, and the military launched a massive military 
operation in this province. As a consequence, civilian casualties were widespread. 
How then can the 2005 Helsinki MoU guarantee lasting peace in Aceh? The 
analysis in the previous sections suggests that both parties have learned from the failures 
of the past, and that the peace agreement is a win-win situation.  The peace in Aceh 
became possible because the 2005 peace agreement accommodated almost all of the 
demands of GAM leaders.  The MoU is comprised of five sections: (a) the governing of 
Aceh; (b) human rights; (c) amnesty; (d) security arrangement; and (e) the establishment 
of the Aceh Monitoring Mission.  The government of Indonesia fulfilled almost all the 
demands of the GAM’s leaders, except foreign affairs, external defense, national security 
and fiscal matters.  What if the GAM leaders still pursue Aceh’s independence? Although 
some GAM leaders remained highly committed to the independence, (as Governor 
Irwandi admitted), since 2005 they have found themselves in a better situation (compared 
to when they were forced to live in the jungles and mountains).  On the other hand, the 
government, and especially the military, must remember that military measures cannot 
stand alone; they have to be combined with other actions (such as law enforcement, 
humanitarian aid, strengthening local government and economic improvement) to address 
the Acehnese grievances.   
The crucial political point, as many scholars have pointed out, was the 
transformation of GAM into a local political party and its willingness to abandon its 
struggle for an independent Aceh.  In return, the government provided amnesty to all 
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GAM combatants.  Additionally, the agreement included the establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, the withdrawal of non-organic TNI troops, as well as the 
release of hundreds of political prisoners.  Even with the successful conclusion of the 
2005 peace agreement, Aceh is not automatically immune from the failures (they 
occurred in the past), and there are still some potential obstacles.  Those who oppose the 
peace agreements said that the government gave GAM too many concessions.  Since the 
beginning of the peace efforts, some hard-line military officers (as well as political elites) 
argued that the 2005 Helsinki peace deal internationalized the case.  This echoed claims 
to the detriment of state sovereignty that the “loss” of East Timor occurred after being 
internationalized.  Of course, Aceh province is different from that of East Timor.  The 
annexation of East Timor by Indonesia was not recognized by the United Nations.  East 
Timor, therefore, was never the part of Indonesia’s territory, since it had been occupied 
by Portuguese, while Aceh was undisputedly under Dutch occupation.  Indonesia as it is 
known today, occupies the territory that was formerly the Dutch East Indies.  In addition , 
many in the TNI are convinced that GAM is still committed to full independence rather 
than autonomy within Indonesia. 
The problem now is not secessionist but mainly economic in nature since there is 
a question about which side benefits from this situation and which one does not.  This is 
the greatest challenge for the government, to generate the best policies for the future of 
Aceh.  Therefore, in order to maintain peace, all parties require guarding against the 
potential for spoilers on both sides to undermine the peace agreement.  After the GAM 
leaders won the local election in 2006, lucrative patronage networks have emerged; jobs 
and contracts have gone to the winners, however, unemployment amongst ex-combatants 
remains high, and this has contributed to incidents involving illegal activities such as 
extortion, robbery, and illegal logging.215  On the other hand, some anti-GAM think that 
economic benefits should go to people who had been loyal to the unitary state of 
Indonesia.   Despite all the shortcomings of the peace process, it is undeniable that the 
2005 Helsinki peace agreement has produced the best solution for Aceh problems.   
                                                 




B. RECOMMENDATION  
The lessons from the past indicate that the policies of the government toward 
Aceh are often damaged by the broken promises of the central government in 
implementing the Special Autonomy law, and then state repression continues.  Since the 
promises were unfulfilled, the unjust implementation of economic policies and the 
continuing impunity of the human rights abusers contributed to the sense of grievance 
and alienation of the locals.  The democratic era suggests the use of the military force 
only as a last resort.  Unfortunately, the local police have been relegated to a minor role 
and are ineffective due to a lack of training, insufficient numbers, having family ties with 
GAM members as they are largely recruited from the locals, economic collusion, and 
even fear.216  The government should take these issues into consideration.   If the police 
are ineffective at doing their jobs maintaining order and law enforcement, this will 
encourage the military to take over the police position.  In a democratic environment, the 
police should be the dominant security force to maintain public order, and not the 
military.  As Heidux put it, democracy fosters peace, or at least brings about more 
peaceful ‘civilian’ policies in dealing with civil contention and internal rebellion.217  For 
those reasons, the police have to demonstrate their ability to investigate and prosecute all 
the perpetrators, and bring them to justice, as the problems in Aceh are mostly in 
connection with criminal activities.  
The recent development in Aceh province that is being widely reported by the 
media also suggests that democracy has the reduced levels of internal conflict and 
strengthened Indonesia’s territorial integrity.  The decentralization and autonomy do not 
fuel separatism, in the case of the Aceh province; people can manage their own affairs at 
the local level and contribute to regional peace and security.  There is no clear indication 
that the Aceh Party (PA) will pursue a referendum on independence after winning the 
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local election as the PA cannot gain independence through a referendum without 
damaging the 2005 peace agreement.  This means that the Indonesia’s territorial integrity 
is not as fragile as it was once thought to be.  The result of the recent election in Aceh 
demonstrated convincingly that a plural society in Indonesia does not threaten nation-
building, destabilize society, ot lead to separatism.218  This is in contrast to local military 
suspicions that the PA attempted to gain independence through a democratic fashion.  
The evidence on the ground, according to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and e-
Card (Community Research for Aceh Development), showed that the PA won a major 
victory with votes ranging between 43.8 percent, while the Democratic Party, the second 
position, had won  around 14.3 percent.219  The PA is established by the former rebels 
and the Democratic Party is founded by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the current 
president of Indonesia, who along with Jusuf Kalla, the vice president is widely known to 
have a strong commitment to the Aceh peace process.  This is clear evidence that the 
Aceh people give credit to the government for its role in bringing peace to Aceh by 
voting for Yudhoyono’s party.  Consequently the military should not interpret the GAM’s 
victory in the local election as separatist in nature, but rather as an act for the full 
implementation of the Law of the Governing of Aceh (Law 11/2006), which is the 
reflection of the 2005 Helsinki agreement.  
The McCormick’s Diamond model and the Kriesberg’s constructive conflict 
resolution are good models for examining the Aceh conflict.  To draw lessons from the 
past as well as to anticipate similar cases, which will likely take place in the future for 
either the Indonesian government in particular, or any government in the world, in 
general.  The root causes of the conflict in Aceh were clearly economic imbalance, 
political injustice, and deprivation of the people, as well as ignorance of local values.  
The situation was then politically exploited by the secessionist leaders, demanding total 
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separation from the sovereign nation.  In the case of Indonesia, the lessons learned from 
the past suggest that military operations were not the answer since the fundamental 
causes of the Acehnese grievances were not properly solved.  Today, the situation has 
changed dramatically, the democratic environment recommends that the military will be 
deployed as a last resort.  On the other hand, GAM leaders must fully understand that 
their efforts to separate from the Republic of Indonesia by any fashion, either democratic 
or non-democratic means that an armed rebellion will fail.  No single country supports 
GAM’s demand for independence; therefore GAM leaders must be realistic and work 
within the democratic state of Indonesia.  So, it is clear that the 2005 Helsinki peace 
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